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Abstract
In this paper regression analysis is used to investigate negative prof-
itability differential between foreign and domestic companies in Nor-
way. More years and industries are included in the sample compared
to previous studies on Norwegian data. Panel data methods, allow-
ing to get rid of get rid of unobserved heterogeneity across the firms,
are applied, in addition to OLS used in most of the earlier literature.
More accurate and detailed classification of firms into different foreign-
ness categories is conducted that allows to ”refine” control group used
for comparisons. The results indicate that multinational firms report
around 30% lower profitability than comparable domestic firms. It has
also been shown that profitability of domestic firms goes down by about
20% when they become multinational. This is after the most impor-
tant characteristics and permanent differences between these two types
of firms have been controlled for. The estimates of the profitability dif-
ferential has been shown to be robust to different estimations methods
used, as well as different definitions of foreignness and profitability
measures. The differential found is consistent with profit shifting be-
havior by multinational companies in Norway, and would imply that
profits are shifted out of Norway. The evidence provided cannot serve
a direct proof of profit-shifting activities by multinational firms in Nor-
way, but it strongly suggests that further research is warranted in order
to get a better understanding of the problem of profit-shifting.
∗This study is an updated and extended version of my master thesis ”Profit-shifting in
Norway: 1993-2005”, supervised by professor Jarle Moen and delivered to NHH in 2007.
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1 Introduction.
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate irregularities observed in
Norwegian data in form of negative profitability differential between domes-
tic and multinational companies. Internationalization theory of the firm
(e.g. Markusen (1995)) predicts that firms that engage in foreign direct in-
vestments (FDI) are expected to possess some form of advantage (in form of
superior technology, know-how, more effective management etc.) that would
allow them to survive and succeed in the new markets. The relatively lower
profitability performance of multinational firms in Norway contradicts this
prediction. This anomaly deserves attention and should be studied further,
since it can be an indication of profit shifting activities by multinational
firms.
In this study, regression analysis is used to study the negative profitabil-
ity differential between domestic and multinational firms observed in raw
data. It aims to rule out the possibility that differences in profitability can
be explained by the underlying differences in characteristics between the two
types of firms. The profitability differential that ”remains” unexplained after
all the possible factors are controlled for would then be argued to provide an
upper limit on the extent of profit shifting activities of multinational firms.
This is in accordance with earlier studies in the field (Grubert et al. (1993),
Oeyler and Emmanuelle (1997, 2002), Langli and Saudagaran (2004)). Re-
alism of assumptions regarding the link between the differential and profit
shifting will be addressed below. Also general advantages and disadvantages
of this indirect approach will be discussed. This comes in addition to main
contribution of this study to earlier literature which in very general terms
is two-fold, and includes using ”richer” and bigger data set for the analysis
and improving the methodology used for estimations. As to the sample, the
period of study will be extended, and more industries will be considered.
The data available will also allow better classification of firms in different
foreignness categories, which may remove ”noise” from the control group
used as a benchmark for profitability comparisons. Furthermore, a number
of additional firm level controls will be introduced in the analysis to improve
the general comparability of the firms. On the methodology side, panel data
methods will be applied in order to do estimations as opposed to OLS, as
in the previous studies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The literature overview comes
first. In the next section main assumptions made in this study are discussed.
3
SNF Working Paper No 05/10
In the following section the data sets and the sample are described. Descrip-
tion of variables and the summary statistics follow. Estimation specification
and estimation methods are presented next. After that, the main results are
presented and discussed. The sensitivity of the main results are then tested
in the ”extensions and sensitivity tests”-section. The paper is concluded
with a summary section which contains an overview over the findings and
conclusions.
2 Related literature.
Number of empirical studies of profit-shifting behavior in multinational com-
panies is in general quite high (see Devereux (2006) for a comprehensive
survey of studies). Some of them analyze different channels through which
profits can be shifted directly. Others, in particular this study, apply the so
called indirect approach for addressing the problem. Under the direct ap-
proach one can, for example, study manipulations by the means of transfer
pricing mechanism directly by observing whether the prices set on goods
and services traded between the affiliates of the multinational companies
are being artificially over- or understated compared to market prices (Swen-
son (2001), Clausing (2003), Bernard et.al (2006)). The indirect approach
implies on the other hand that one studies the observable measures, like
profitability, that are expected to be affected by the different profit shifting
mechanisms. While the former approach allows making more concrete con-
clusions regarding evidence of the one or the other mechanisms used, the
advantage of the indirect approach lies in the fact that it may help to capture
profit-shifting activities through the mechanisms that are not yet known to
researchers. This is an important advantage given the nature of the profit
shifting problem that is characterized by asymmetry of information between
tax authorities and researchers on one side and firms and their consultants
and lawyers on the other side. Moreover, the indirect approach may be the
only available option to the researchers due to the data limitations, which
is a common problem in this field of research. In the situations like that,
even though there is a danger of capturing more than just profit shifting
activities, the indirect approach can be helpful in shedding the light on the
problem and indicating necessity and directions for future research.
The study that was the first to bring attention to the problem of negative
profitability differentials between multinational and domestic firms, and thus
started the line of the literature that this study follows, originates from the
US. It is the study by Grubert et al (1993), where they use tax data to
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uncover what lies behind low taxable income reported by foreign-owned af-
filiates in the US. There, statistical analysis was applied to see how much of
the differential found in raw data can be explained by observable differences
between these two types of firms. Their main finding is that around 50%
of the differences in profitability between foreign-owned and domestically
owned firms can be explained by different firm characteristics and other
observable factors, among others maturation effects, exchange rate fluctu-
ations and revaluation effects. They argue that the part of the differential
that remains after the controls are accounted for can be considered as an
upper bound on the extent of profit-shifting, most likely by the means of
transfer price manipulations. Grubert (1997) extends the study by Grubert
et al. (1993) in several respects among other things using data for several
more years and applying different measure of profitability in the analysis.
As a main result, he finds that as much as 75% of the profitability differ-
ential between the foreign and domestic controlled firms can be explained
by systematic observed characteristics between them. He also finds that
companies that are owned from abroad with ownership share between 25
and 50%, show the same type of systematic differences in profitability as
100% controlled companies when compared to domestic companies. Since
one would expect that local majority owners would try to limit such activ-
ities by foreign owners, this makes him contemplate on whether also other
reasons than profit shifting can lie behind the differential.
The results of a similar study, Kinney and Lawrence (2000) also put under
the test the assumption that differences in tax payments observed in data
can be attributed to profit shifting behavior. Their strategy is to investigate
the relative tax burden of foreign controlled and domestic companies. They
find that tax payments are indeed lower among the foreign controlled com-
panies as compared to domestic companies. However, they suggest a way to
test whether these are profit manipulations or real changes in profitability
that are causing this differential. They use market return to equity to see
whether it is consistent with profitability differences. The idea is that since
market return to equity is ”real” market response it would not go down as
much if the differences were merely caused by profit-shifting. They find how-
ever that low profitability that one observes among foreign controlled firms
is also associated with low market return to equity. Thus, they conclude that
other reasons that profit shifting can lie behind the observed differences. An
alternative explanation they offer is that foreign investors are not always as
successful as domestic firms in choosing the best targets for takeover. The
contribution by Kinney and Lawrence (2002) is important. However, the
evidence they provide is not without limitations. Even though it questions
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whether the differential is caused by profit shifting activities of the firms,
it still does not prove directly that it does not. Moreover, they concentrate
on a sample of firms that are controlled by foreigners with less than 100%,
thus omitting the important group of firms that may be most exposed to
profit shifting activities. The alternative explanation for the diferential they
propose can however be an issue for future research.
Of the non-American studies using this indirect method of analysis, one can
mention Oyelere and Emmanuel (1998). They use data on UK-based firms to
compare profitability, as well as dividend distribution of the UK-controlled
and foreign controlled firms, and get results consistent with profit shifting
behavior of foreign controlled corporations. They match companies based
on their total assets and industry composition to uncover the differences in
profitability and dividend distribution between the two types of companies.
In the main part of the study they use logit regression analysis to find that
probability that the firm is foreign controlled is higher if it reports lower
profitability and high dividend payout ratio. They conclude that this result
is consistent with profit-shifting behavior since firms with equal capabilities
(as measured by total assets) should otherwise be similar in terms of per-
formance (profitability) and post performance measures (dividend payout)
independent of where they are controlled from. Also here transfer price ma-
nipulations are named to be the most probable mechanism for the potential
profit-shifting activities. Four years later Oyelere and Emmanuel (2002) up-
date their analysis by adding observations for a longer time period and still
find evidence of significant negative profitability differential between domes-
tic and foreign controlled corporations in UK. However, in the latter paper
they are less conclusive regarding the mechanisms that may lie behind, and
do not exclude that differences in real activities that may also lie behind it.
In Norway the problem of profitability differential between domestic and
foreign firms was first addressed in the study by Hægeland (2003), which is
published as a part of the report by the Tax evaluation commission (Skat-
teutvalget) in Norway. One of the chapters in this study (5.6) investigates
whether foreign-controlled and domestic companies in Norway have system-
atic differences in returns to total assets. Only weakly statistically significant
difference was found in profitability between the two types of companies, and
it was reported to be positive rather than negative as opposed to the above
mentioned studies from other countries. These results indicate that if any-
thing, the net flow of profits goes in rather than out of Norway. In addition
to being in conflict with the results of similar international studies, these
results are also the opposite of what is presented in another study based on
Norwegian data by Langli and Saudagran (2004) published two years later.
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The results by Langli and Saudagaran (2004) suggest that FCCs in Norway
report systematically lower profitability as measured in several different ways
and after a number of important firm characteristics are controlled for. Both
of the papers follow approach similar to that in Grubert et al.(1993), and
both of them, based on unconsolidated firm-level data on companies in Nor-
way use regression analysis to investigate profitability differential between
foreign controlled corporations (FCC) and domestically controlled corpora-
tions (DCC). However, the studies differ in terms of sample, profitability
measures and control variables included in the analysis. At least some of
these differences can potentially explain the contradicting results reported in
the papers. For example, since the study by Langli and Saudagaran (2004)
is based on a shorter time period and only considers a limited number of
industry groups, it can be argued that the negative differential found in
Langli and Saudagaran (2004) can be specific to the limited sample they
use for analysis. The contradicting results described above contributed to
motivation for conducting this study.
Most of the papers described above, using indirect approach, provide empiri-
cal evidence consistent with profit-shifting. This does not mean that the dif-
ferential in profitability between foreign-controlled and domestic companies
can be directly attributed to tax motivated profit-shifting behavior. Just a
few of the earlier papers discuss the underlying assumptions regarding this
link. Some of them, go one step further and try to test the link between the
observed profitability differential and tax-motivated profit-shifting empiri-
cally. These are a the papers that tried to relate the differences in profitabil-
ity to differences in tax rates the affiliates of multinational companies are
facing. Klassen et al (1993) for example study whether profitability changes
of US multinational companies are related to tax changes in US and inter-
national tax rate changes over time. They find that changes in profitability
are consistent with flows of profit being shifted to the regions where the tax
rates has been reduced and away from the regions with high tax rates. Also
Harris (1993) that focuses on tax change in US as a result of 1986 TRA
reform finds evidence that profitability of firms in US has been responsive
to these changes in a way consistent with profit shifting behavior. Collins
et al (1998) compared profitability of US multinational firms to themselves
rather than using a control group for comparisons, and also found that
profitability of US manufacturing multinational firms is related to average
foreign tax rates. Among the European papers that studied the profit shift-
ing incentives by relating differences in profitability to tax rate differences
one could name Huizinga and Leavan (2008) and Dischinger (2007). Both
of these studies are based on a sample of European multinational compa-
7
SNF Working Paper No 05/10
nies (Amadeus database), and both provide evidence consistent with profit
shifting behavior. The main difference between the two is that the latter
extends the analysis in the former by including several more years in the
analysis and using fixed effects model for estimations, thus accounting for
firms specific effects. As inspired by this literature, in the sensitivity tests
section the analysis will be extended to incorporate tax rates of the foreign
parent companies into analysis to see whether they will systematically affect
the differences in profitability of the foreign controlled companies.
To conclude, I would like to specify the goals and contributions of this study.
The idea of this paper is not only to resolve the controversy with regard to
the already published results in Norwegian studies, but also to update and
extend the existing analysis in several respects in order to shed more light
on the issue of profitability differences between multinational and domestic
companies in Norway. Contributions to existing literature include the fol-
lowing. Firstly, the period of study is extended to 13 years (from 1993 to
2005), as opposed to 6-years period in Hægeland (2002) and 4-years period
in Langli and Saudagaran (2004). Secondly, all industries in private sec-
tor (excluding oil and mining) are included in the analysis, as opposed to
all non-financial industries in Hægeland (2002) and only 3 industry groups
in Langli and Saudagaran (2004). This will make it possible among other
things to see if the profitability differential is driven by any particular in-
dustry. The data available will also allow better classification of firms in
different foreignness categories, which may remove ”noise” from the con-
trol group used as a benchmark for profitability comparisons. This means
among other things that as opposed to comparing foreign controlled firms
to domestically controlled firms (that may have subsidiaries abroad), it will
be possible to compare profitability of multinational firms to profitability
of pure domestic firms. Furthermore, additional firm level controls will be
introduced in the analysis to improve the general comparability of the firms.
On the methodology side, panel data methods will be applied in order to
do estimations as opposed to OLS, as in most of the previous studies. Main
advantage of the panel data methods is that they allow getting rid of un-
observed heterogeneity between the firms that when not accounted for can
cause a bias in profitability differential estimates. Moreover, since panel
data methods allow studying deviations of performance of the firms from
their own means, they make it possible to directly address the question of
what happens to profitability of the firms as they change their foreignness
status.
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3 Discussion of the underlying assumptions.
In most of the earlier papers discussed above, negative profitability differen-
tial has been commonly attributed to tax motivated profit-shifting by means
of transfer pricing manipulations. Thus, several important assumptions were
implicitly made in all these papers. The first one is that the profitability
differential that is observed in data is caused by the profit shifting activities
of the firms. Second, nothing is explicitly said about the motive for profit
shifting, tax minimization assumed to be the main motive. Finally, trans-
fer price manipulations are assumed to be the mechanism behind the profit
shifting activities. This section is devoted to a short discussion of these main
assumptions that are made in the previous literature as well as in this study.
First of all, there can other reasons than profit shifting that lie behind the
observed profitability differential. The idea behind the approach used here
is to control for as many characteristics of the companies as possible, so as
to be able to compare profitability of the firms that are similar in all other
respects than multinationality. However, there still may be some factors
that affect the profitability of the national and multinational firms differ-
ently, but are not accounted for. Most of the previous papers in the field
have concentrated their attention on observable characteristics of the firms.
Going a step further, panel data techniques will be used in order to also
control for the time-invariant unobservable characteristics of the firms, like
management quality and productivity and efficiency differences between the
firms that can be difficult to measure. A number of controls for the ob-
servable characteristics of the firms that have not be used in the previous
studies will also be included. For example, the possibility that multina-
tional companies pay higher wages to their workers and thus are on aver-
age less profitable will be controlled for. Additionally, lower profitability
of multinational companies may be due to the fact that foreigners having
less information than local investors make systematically bad choices when
choosing which companies to invest in. This issue has been raised in some
of the papers relevant to this topic (Kinney and Lawrence (2000)). Trying
to control for this particular possibility will be a topic for future research.
Other tests that can help to establish (at least indirect) connection between
the differential and profit shifting activities will be done in the ”extensions
and sensitivity tests”-section below.
Secondly, one cannot conclude with confidence from studying profitability
differentials that profits are shifted solely in order to reduce tax payments.
Among the alternative motives for profit shifting one can mention the desire
to have better control over the profits which may motivate parent companies
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to shift profits to the company headquarters rather than leaving them for
subsidiaries managers disposition. In one of the sections below, tax rates
will be incorporated into analysis, in order to see whether it can be shown
that taxes are related to the profitability differentials observed.
Lastly, even though transfer price manipulations has been the mechanisms
most widely discussed in literature so far, it is just one of the possible ways
to shift profits. Other than transfer price manipulations, the ways to shift
profits may for example include manipulations with the flows of royalty pay-
ments. This refers to the situations where intangible assets of the company,
like patents and licenses, are located in the countries with preferential tax
regimes, so that royalty fees, which also can be artificially overstated, will
be concentrated in the countries where the minimum taxes will be paid on
them. The profits can also be shifted by the means of debt shifting (also
referred to as restructured financial arrangements in Klassen et al (1993)).
Since interest payments on debt are tax deductible, the corporations can
have incentives to ”shift” debt (via internal lending and borrowing) to their
subsidiaries in the high tax countries, thus reducing their tax liabilities there.
In norwegian data, one can only observe aggregate borrowing, but cannot
distinguish between the internal debt (debt that comes from within cor-
poration) and external debt. But controlling for aggregate leverage in the
regressions below allows at least partly to control for the profit shifting ac-
tivities through debt shifting channel. However it still does not account
for the fact that interest payments for loans can be over- or understated.
Neither can it be possible to control for royalty fees manipulations with the
data available. So both of these mechanisms can be captured by the esti-
mated differential. Moreover, the list of the other potential mechanisms can
be long, and will also most likely include items not known to researchers.
This is caused by the very nature of the profit shifting problem, that it will
always be characterized by asymmetric information, as already mentioned
above, between the firms, their consultants and lawyers on one side and
tax authorities and researchers on the other side. In addition, even if the
mechanisms are generally known, the data necessary to reveal them is usu-
ally confidential and thus not publicly available. The approach used here,
which involves studying profitability differential is a good starting point for
analysis of profit shifting given these limitations. Even though it does not
give us a possibility to uncover with confidence the means used for profit
shifting, it allows us to estimate at least the upper limits to the extent of
profit shifting activities.
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4 The data sets and sample.
The sample is constructed by combining three different data sets. The first
data set, provided by Dun&Bradstreet (D&B), contains data on financial
statistics of all companies registered in Norway. The second data set, SI-
FON, provides data on foreign ownership in Norwegian companies (inbound
FDI). Finally, Utenlandsoppgaver-data set, provided by Tax Authorities
(Skattedirektoratet) in Norway, has data on direct investments of Norwe-
gian companies abroad (outbound FDI). These three data sets are merged
by unique organizations number with which each of the companies in Nor-
way is registered with. This allows us to identify the extent of inbound
and outbound FDI each of the companies in Norway is involved in, and to
classify firms in the sample into 9 different categories. The categories are
presented in table 1 and described below.
Table 1: Categories of firms.
DCC FCC Both types
Without FDI 1 2 5
With FDI 3 4 6
Both types 7 8 9
1. Domestically controlled companies without foreign direct investments
(or pure domestic companies).
2. Foreign controlled companies in Norway that do not have foreign di-
rect investments. A company is considered as foreign controlled if
foreign investors (in total) directly own more than 50% of shares of
this company.
3. Domestically controlled companies in Norway that have foreign direct
investments. A company is said to have foreign direct investments if
it directly or indirectly owns more than 50% of the shares in a foreign
company.
4. Foreign controlled companies that have direct investments abroad.
5. Companies in Norway that may be foreign or domestically controlled,
but do not have foreign direct investments.
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6. Companies in Norway that may be foreign or domestically controlled,
and have direct investments abroad.
7. Domestically controlled companies that may have foreign direct in-
vestments.
8. Foreign controlled companies that may have foreign direct investments.
9. Companies in Norway that may be foreign or domestically controlled,
and with or without foreign direct investments (All companies in the
sample).
The possibility of more precise classifying the firms into different categories
is one of the important contributions of this study. The advantage is that
the main variable of interest (”foreignness”), discussed below, can now be
defined in several different ways. This imples that a number of different def-
initions for domestic firms can be used, thus making it possible to obtain a
”cleaner” control group (more about that in the next section). For compari-
son, of the 9 categories above only two (7 and 8) has been used in the studies
by Hægeland (2003) and Langli and Saudagaran (2004). Only one definition
of foreignness (namely foreign control) was thus used in these studies (and
in most of the other earlier studies). It means that their ”control” group was
”polluted” with domestically controlled firms that have subsidiaries abroad,
and thus may have similar possibilities for shifting profits as foreign con-
trolled firms.
To construct the sample, I followed the framework by Langli and Sauda-
garn (2004). The restrictions done to the original data set are the following
1:
• Firstly, only limited liability companies are included in the sample.
• Further, companies with total assets of less than NOK 1 000 000 are
excluded. This is done in order to avoid the the potential ”noise”
from a big number of small companies, among which the share of
multinational companies is very small.
• Companies with non-positive sales2 are eliminated. This restriction is
done in order to study the behavior of productive firms.
1The restrictions are done after the variables are deflated to 1998 NOK using average
yearly CPI provided by SSB.
2Total operating revenue is used as a measure of sales throughout the paper.
12
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• Companies which had profitability ratios as measured by Taxable In-
come to Sales of more than 1 in absolute value are excluded. This is
also a common restrictions done in the related literature and makes in-
terpretation of the coefficients more intuitive (percentage point changes).
• Additionally, the observations for which the adjusted TI/Sales ratio
has been very different (more than 0.5 in absolute value) from the
reported Income before Taxes/Sales ratio were excluded.
• Companies with leverage ratios (long-term and short-term debt to to-
tal assets) of less than 0 and bigger than 3 are dropped.
• Observations with Fixed/Total Assets ratio and Wage cost share of
less than 0 and more than 1 are dropped from the sample too.
• Reported income before taxes is adjusted for temporary and perma-
nent differences. Since the adjustment factor required data from fi-
nancial statements for the previous year, the observations, for which
this was information was missing dropped out.
The final sample differs however from that used in Langli and Saudagaran
(2004) in that:
• a longer time period is considered for analysis: 1993-2005.
• all industries are included (except mining and quarrying) as opposed
to just 3 industries hey considered
After all the restrictions are done, the final sample consists of 657 823 ob-
servations. The number of observations lost due to each of the restrictions
is reported in Table 1. The different columns in Table 1 refer to the for-
eignness status of the firms. As described above, FMNC refers to foreign
multinational firms, DMNC - to domestic multinational firms, MNC - to
multinational firms that are either DMNC or FMNC, and DNC is an abbre-
viation for purely domestic firms.
5 The variables.
5.1 Dependent variables.
The main dependent variable is Taxable Income to Sales. Taxable Income
is calculated by adjusting Net Income before Taxes (NIBT) as reported in
financial statements, for temporary and permanent differences (Klassen et
13
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Table 2: Exclusion restrictions.
Number of observations
FMNC DMNC MNC DNC Total %
Original data set 64 231 9 191 73422 1 646 719 1 720 141 100 %
Limited Liability Companies 58 430 8 658 67 088 1 545 594 1 612 682 94 %
Total Assets more than 1 mln NOK 45 667 8 442 54 109 898 013 952 122 55 %
Postive Sales 40 651 7 071 47 722 823 088 870 810 59 %
Absolute value (TI/Sales)<1 34 668 5 162 39 830 650 561 690 391 40 %
Absolute value ((TI-resfs)/Sales)<0,5 33 874 4 766 38 640 631 427 670 067 39%
0<Debt ratios<3 33 448 4 702 38 150 624 735 662 885 39 %
0<Fixed Assets/Total Assets<1 33 443 4 702 38 145 624 597 662 742 39 %
0<Wage cost share<1 33 390 4 693 38 083 623 652 661 735 39 %
All industries (except oil extract.) 32 663 4 602 37 265 620 558 657 823 38 %
Final sample (1993-2005) 32 663 4 602 37 265 620 558 657 823 38%
al (1993), Jacob (1996), Langli and Saudagaran (2004)):
TIi,t = NIBTi,t + [(DTLi,t−1 −DTLi,t +DTAi,t −DTAi,t−1)]/TRi,t
where
NIBTi,t- net income before taxes
DTLi,t- deferred tax liability
DTAi,t- deferred tax asset
TRi,t- is the effective tax rate, calculated as:
TEi,t
NIBTi,t
, where TEi,t is tax
expense.
Alternative measures for profitability will be applied in sensitivity tests check
section in order to rule out the possibility that the differential is only spe-
cific to this particular profitability measure used. They will include taxable
income to total assets ratio; return on capital, defined as a ratio of oper-
ating income and financial revenues to total assets; and operating margin
(measured as a ratio of operating profit to sales).
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5.2 Explanatory variables.
Foreignness-varaible.
The definitions of ”foreignness” that are going to be used in the analysis
are the following:
• MNC - multinational companies, which are companies that are either
foreign controlled or have subsidiaries abroad or both (categories 2, 3,
4, 6 and 8 in table 1). Firms that are MNC can further be divided
into DMNC and FMNC:
• DMNC - domestic multinational companies, which are domestically
controlled companies with subsidiaries abroad (category 3 in table 1).
• FMNC - foreign multinational companies, which are foreign con-
trolled companies located in Norway that may or may not have sub-
sidiaries abroad (categories 2, 4 and 8 in table 1). This is a definition
of foreignness that is used in most of the previous papers in the field
as described in the Relevant literature-section. Also here the classifi-
cation can be refined even further, so that one can distinguish between
the following two types of FMNC companies:
• FCC+FDI - foreign controlled companies, that have subsidiaries
abroad (category 4 in table 1).
• FCC-FDI - foreign controlled companies, that do not have sub-
sidiaries abroad (category 2 in table 1).
The category that will serve as a benchmark in this study will be:
• DNC - domestic national companies, which are pure domestic com-
panies, i.e. are neither foreign controlled, nor do they have controlling
ownership share in subsidiaries abroad (category 1 in table 1).
For the number of observations in each of these categories (for each of the
years in the sample) see table 20 in Appendix.
Other explanatory variables:
Industry affiliation
Langli and Saudagaran (2004), where they have considered only firms in
trade and manufacturing, used a dummy variable that takes value one if
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the company is in trade industry and zero if it is in the manufacturing in-
dustry. This dummy does not allow distinguishing between the numerous
sub-sectors within each of the industries that may differ from each other
greatly (e.g. manufacturing of pharmaceuticals vs. manufacturing of hard-
ware). Moreover more than just two industry groups are included in this
study. That is why dummy variables for each of the 2- and 3-digit NACE
codes has been created instead. Industry dummies based on 2-digit NACE
codes are used in the analysis in Hægeland (2003). However, since they
still do not allow distinguishing between the sub-sectors in trade industries,
dummy for NACE 3 digit codes will be used to control for industry effects in
the regressions. In total, there are 233 industry groups on a 3-digit NACE
level in the sample.
Leverage ratio
Several leverage variables are used in the analysis. The first one is the
long-term interest-bearing debt ratio which is constructed as the ratio of
long-term interest-bearing debt to total assets. The second is the short-term
interest bearing debt ratio which is constructed as a ratio between short term
interest bearing liabilities to total assets. The last one is short-term non-
interest bearing debt ratio (a ratio between short term non-interest bearing
debt and total assets). It is important to control for debt in the regressions
as shifting of (internal) debt is also a known channel for profit shifting (note
however, that here only control for the aggregate debt is present, since data
does not allow distinguishing between the debt that comes from other affili-
ates in the same corporation or from external sources). Manipulations with
short- vs. long-term debt can be another source of profit manipulations,
which is the main reason for controlling for short-term debt in the analysis.
For comparison, only control for long-term debt was included in the analy-
sis in Langli and Saudagaran (2004). No control for leverage is present in
Hægeland (2002), something that can be expected to affect his estimate of
the differential.
Expected sign: negative for interest-bearing debt (since interest payments
reduce taxable income). No clear prediction for non-interest bearing debt.
Tangibility
Tangibility variable is constructed as ratio of fixed assets (sum of buildings,
plants and equipment) to total assets.
Expected sign: positive (it can be easier to get financing for firms with high
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tangibility ratio, as tangible/fixed assets can be used as collateral when
borrowing funds, thus better investment possibilities) or negative (since de-
preciation allowances reduce taxable income).
Size
The size of the company is measured by its Sales. In Langli and Saudagaran
(2004), a dummy for each of the 5 quantiles of Sales is created and included
in the regressions to control for size. Dummy ”Sales 1” takes value 1 if firm
belongs to the 1st Sales quantile and zero otherwise, etc. In this study both
sales quintile dummies and fourth order polynom in sales will be used as a
control for size. The latter is chosen to be the main size control as it seems
to be a better approximation for the relation between profitability and size
of the company. Alternatively, one could use total assets as a measure of
the size of the company. The sensitivity of the results to these alternative
size measures is tested in the sensitivity tests section.
Expected sign: ambiguous (bigger firms have more possibilities to enjoy
economies of scale which are expected to be positively correlated with the
firms profitability. But on the other hand, big companies may also have
more resources and incentives to involve in profit-shifting and thus have
lower reported profits).
Age
The fourth order polynoms in age will be used as control for maturity of the
firms. Age is calculated as the difference between the date of establishment
and the year of the financial statement. The effect of an alternative control
for age will be tested (following Langli and Saudagaran (2004)). Firms will
be divided into 4 groups: 0-5 years old, 5-10 years old, 10-20 years old,
more than 20 years old. A dummy corresponding to each of the groups is
generated.
Expected sign: positive (it can be expected that young firms may report
lower profitability due to start-up costs, and that profitability will increase
as the firm matures).
Wage cost share
Wage cost share is calculated as share of wage costs in the total operating
costs of the firm. This variable that have not been used in any of the papers
described above (mostly due to the data limitations) is meant to serve as
a proxy for the wage level in the firms, and thus account for the fact that
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multinational firms can be paying higher wages to their workers, which in
turn can be one of the factors behind their low profitability as compared to
domestics firms.
Expected sign: negative (higher wages all other things being equal reduce
profits).
Time effects
Year dummies are included in each of the regressions in order to control
for general time effects common for all firms and changes in macroeconomic
conditions.
5.3 Summary statistics.
Summary statistics for the main variables are presented in the table 3 below.
All the numbers are in 1000 1998 NOK.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics (thousand NOK).
Total FMNC DMNC MNC DNC
Mean (St.error) Mean Mean Mean Mean
Taxable Income 2 044 (51 414) 7 527 61 355 14 166 1 316
Total Assets 46 519 (1 971 302) 181 225 2 041 427 410 670 24 647
Sales 32 442 (307 034) 154 959 590 216 208 646 21 859
Taxable Income/Sales 0.1015 (0.2311 0.0434 0.0891 0.0491 0.1044
Taxable Income/Total Assets 0.0915 (0,1756) 0.0667 0.0680 0.0667 0.0929
Operating margin 0.1444 (0.2451) 0.0478 0.0768 0.0514 0.1499
Return to capital 0.1236 (0.1797) 0.0863 0.1009 0.0881 0.1258
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 0.2777 (0.3350) 0.1124 0.1404 0.1158 0.2875
Wage cost share 0.2573 (0.2420) 0.2344 0.2714 0.2389 0.2584
Long-term debt ratio (int.bearing) 0.2829 (0.3216) 0.1494 0.2029 0.1559 0.2906
Short-term debt ratio (int.bearing) 0.1061 (0.1790) 0.2132 0.1517 0.2056 0.1001
Short-term debt ratio (non-int.bearing) 0.3706 ( 0.2821) 0.3802 0.2636 0.3659 0.3709
Age 13.19 (14.26) 15.38 21.85 16.18 13.01
Obs. 657 823 32 663 4 602 37 265 620 558
As it can be seen from table 3, purely domestic companies represent the
largest group in the sample. The number of multinational companies in
the sample is relatively small (37 625 observations over 13 years), with the
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number of domestic multinational companies being even smaller (4 602 ob-
servations). When it concerns the size of the companies, the mean total
assets of the firms in the sample lie at around 46.5 million NOK. However,
the dispersion in the average values of total assets in the firms with different
foreignness status is large (as also seen from standard errors). For example
one can see that the average value of capital for the domestic multinational
companies (DMNC) that constitute less that 1% of observations in the sam-
ple is at around 2 billions NOK. Pure domestic companies on the other hand
are reported with the lowest values of capital in the sample, which is approx-
imately 17 times less than the average capital value for the multinational
firms in the sample. The pattern is the same if size is measured in terms of
sales: also here purely domestic companies come out to be the smallest and
domestic multinationals are the largest. The dispersion of the values of sales
is smaller than the case is for total assets, but still considerable. This may
rise a question of whether the companies so different in size can be compa-
rable. To account for the size differences the dependent variable is scaled
with sales (and total assets in the sensitivity checks section) and control for
size explicitly in the regressions (as described above). The regressions are
also run on each of the sales quantiles groups (based on firms average sales)
separately in order to make the compared groups more homogenous.
Purely domestic firms are also shown to have a relatively bigger proportion
of fixed assets in their total assets, which is more than two times higher than
the corresponding proportions for multinational firms. As opposed to what
one would expect the wage cost share is slightly lower for foreign controlled
than for domestic firms, but is the highest for the domestically controlled
firms that have direct investments abroad. Purely domestic firms also have
more than two times more in debt as measured by both long-term and short
term interest-bearing debt ratio than the multinational firms. This is inter-
esting to note due to the fact that internal debt-shifting can be one of the
important channels for profit shifting by multinational firms. In norwegian
data, it is not possible distinguish between internal debt (debt that comes
from within corporation) and external debt. But the aggregate figures in
table 3 indicate that at least on average, the multinational firms in Norway
are not over-leveraged. The ratio of short-term non-interest bearing debt is
almost the same for the two types of companies.
Another thing to note here is that even though purely domestic companies
are smallest in size and on average have low taxable income, the profitability
ratios reveal that they are always more profitable compared to multinational
companies. The profitability difference between the multinational and do-
mestic companies lies in between around 3 and 10 percentage points and is
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the largest when measured in term of operating margin. Regression analysis
is used to investigate these profitability differentials in further detail below.
6 Estimation specification.
The basic regression equation to be estimated is in accordance to that in
earlier literature, among others Langli and Saudagaran (2004), and looks
like following:
Πit = β1 · fit + γ ·Xit + σt + uit (1)
where:
Πit - stands for a profitability, which in the baseline regressions is mea-
sured by the ratio of Taxable Income over Sales.
fit - is the ”foreignness” variable which is the main variable, and β1 is
the parameter of interest. β1 will represent the profitability differential and
is expected to reflect the net effect of profit shifting. It will be negative if
foreign corporations report systematically lower profitability than domestic
companies, indicating that profits may be shifted out of Norway. The op-
posite will be true if the coefficient will turn out positive. The only two
studies done on Norwegian data define foreignness variable as foreign con-
trol variable (FCC), but report contradicting results for this sign. Langli
and Saudagaran (2004) reports negative coefficient for it, while positive coef-
ficient is reported in a similar, even though less detailed study by Hægeland
(2003). One of the important goals of this study is to estimate the model
as specified above to find out what causes the results in the previous two
studies to differ. Furthermore, as already mentioned above, the foreignness
variable will be defined in several different ways. As a result, it will be pos-
sible to remove domestically controlled firms with foreign subsidiaries from
the control group. As they may also have incentives to shift profits in or out
of Norway, failing to do that would over- or underestimate the estimates of
the differential depending on whether the net profit shifting through foreign
parents and subsidiaries by foreign controlled companies goes in the same
or opposite direction.
Xit - stands for the control variables that represent various firm character-
istics, like size, age, leverage, wage cost share and tangibility (as described
in detail above).
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σt - represent year fixed effects, and imply that the intercept is allowed
vary over time. The time effects are meant to capture the effects that vary
over time but are common for all the firms, like for example changes in
macroeconomic conditions.
εit - is the error term.
This specification (which can be referred to as time effects specification)
will be used as the baseline equation and, following Langli and Saudagaran
(2004) approach, will be estimated by Pooled OLS. Pooled OLS is the sim-
plest estimator to apply. However one of its disadvantages is that it assumes
that all observations are independently and identically distributed, and thus
it does not take account of the fact the data are in panel format. This is
a problematic assumption since two observations of one firm from different
years would most likely be correlated with each other. This would imply
that standard errors in OLS estimations will be wrong. One of the ways to
account for that fact is to introduce firm-specific time-invariant effects into
the specification by allowing the intercept to vary across the units. This is
done in the fixed effects model discussed below. Since the specification above
does not account for these firm fixed effects directly, they are ”hidden” in
the error term there. The modified specification of the model, where firm
fixed effects are accounted for explicitly, will then look like as follows:
Πit = β1 · fit + γ ·Xit + σt + αi + εit (2)
This is a fixed effect specification, where all the variables and parameters
are as above, except that the error term uit is now decomposed into:
αi - which is parameter that represents unobservable firm-specific effects
that are time-invariant. This can be for example quality of management,
production efficiency or other factors that are difficult to measure. And
εit - an idiosyncratic error, which can vary both across firms and time.
In this latter specification the intercept is allowed to vary not only over
time, but also from one firm to another. This is important, since there can
be good reasons to believe that these firm-specific effects in the case can
be correlated with the foreignness variable, thus introducing endogeneity in
the model. There are several factors that can cause that. According to
the internationalization theory of the firm, for example, productivity and
efficiency of the firms may affect their willingness and ability to involve in
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foreign direct investments. Similarly, if foreignness is defined as foreign con-
trol, the decision of foreign investors to take over the firm can be influenced
by the productivity of that firm. If firm-fixed effects and foreignness variable
are indeed correlated, failing to account for the firm fixed effects properly
will lead to an omitted variable bias. It implies that the OLS estimate of
the profitability differential will be biased. The direction of the bias will
depend on whether the relation between these unobservable factors and the
foreignness variable is positive or negative. One would expect that these are
the most productive and successful firms that decide to extend abroad. In
this case the expectation is that pooled OLS estimate will underestimate (in
absolute terms) the true effect of foreignness on profitability. The relation
is not so obvious on the foreign control side: if foreign investors involve in
”cherry picking”, thus choosing the best performing firms to acquire, the
bias will again be expected to be positive implying that the pooled OLS co-
efficient for f is understated. The bias will go in the opposite direction if the
foreign investors are rather interested in taking over the poorly performing
firms.
7 Estimation methods.
In the previous subsection the possibility of the omitted variables bias has
been discussed, as well as the direction in which the bias can go in. In-
dependent of which direction the bias goes in, it is important to get rid
of it. There are several ways of doing so, since the data available is in
panel format. Namely, different panel data methods will be applied in order
to estimate the model, including first-differencing, fixed effects models and
long-differencing.
7.1 First-difference model.
In this model one gets rid of the firm fixed effects by estimating the model
in the first-difference (FD) form, so that the specification to be estimated
will be the following:
Πit−Πi,t−1 = β1·(fit−fi,t−1)+γ ·(Xit−Xi,t−1)+(σt−σt−1)+(εit−εi,t−1) (3)
where Πi,t−1 - is value of the profitability variable in the previous year, and
similarly for the rest variables. The fixed effects disappear as αi,t−1 = αi.
It is interesting to note that first-differencing also constitutes the idea behind
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the difference-in-difference estimator. This is an estimator that is widely
used in evaluating the effects of introducing new policies/treatments. One
can regard becoming a multinational company (either by being taken over
by foreigners or getting subsidiaries abroad) as being a ”treatment”: so that
the firms that become multinational are considered as a ”treated” group, and
the firms that remained domestic will be a ”control” group. Assume for sim-
plicity that only two periods of time are considered, where the firms may get
a treatment in the second period. In this context, it may correspond to the
situation where all of the firms are domestic in the first period, while some
of them may become multinational in the next period. Estimating the first
differenced specification (3) as formulated above by OLS, will imply that
β1 will now represent the ”treatment effect”, i.e. the effect on profitability
of becoming a multinational all other things being equal. More closely it
will allow us to estimate the difference between change in profitability of
the firms that have been ”treated”, i.e. became multinational from one pe-
riod to another, and change in profitability of those that remained domestic
(”control” group), all other things being equal. This comparison is however
done under assumption that ”treated” firms would have had the same prof-
itability as those that are in the ”control” group if they would not change
the status. The interpretation of the coefficient in this study can also be less
straightforward due to the fact that there are more than two time periods
to consider, and firms change foreignness status all at different times. Thus,
it can be appropriate to use generalized form of the difference-in-difference
estimator which is a fixed effects estimator. The latter can be used when
dealing with many time periods and when the ”treatment” may occur in
different time periods for different firms without any particular pattern.
7.2 Fixed effects model.
Fixed effects model (FE) represents an alternative way of getting rid of firm
specific effects. This is achieved by estimating the model with fixed effects
in a time-demeaned form:
Πit − Π¯i = β1 · (fit − f¯i) + γ · (Xit − X¯i) + (σt − σ¯) + (εit − ε¯i) (4)
where all the variables with bar-sign over refer to the time means of the
variables. For example, the firm average profitability is calculated as Π¯i =
T−1ΣtΠit, where T is the number of years the firms has observations on.
Since the regression here is done on deviations of the variables from their
mean values over time, the firm specific effects, that are assumed time in-
variant (α¯i = T−1Σtαi = αi), get cancelled out.
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The estimates of a ”treatment effect” (β1) as estimated by FE and FD are
not expected to be the same since the number of periods considered here
is more than two. Baltagi (2008) with reference to Laporte and Windmei-
jer (2005) argues also that the two estimates can differ considerably in the
cases where ”treatment” (in this case change of ownership status) does not
occur systematically at the same time for all firms, and when the effects of
changing the status are not constant over time. They argue that if this is
the case a more flexible specification (which will include dummy variables
for years before and after status change) is needed for these two estimators
to give similar results. Considering this issue in further detail will however
be left for future research.
Both first differencing and fixed effects models help to eliminate the firm
specific time invariant effect from the specification, thus helping to solve the
problem of omitted variable bias described above. There is however one an-
other problem this specification can suffer from, that would be worsened by
these transformations. This is the potential measurement error problem in
the foreignness variable that may arise from the fact that firms may be mis-
classified between the different categories, mostly due to timing differences
between actual and reported status change. If not properly accounted for, it
can cause attenuation bias in the main parameter of interest, as estimated
by the models above, driving the estimates for foreignness-variable towards
zero. The main motivation for estimating the model using the method de-
scribed next is that it can reduce the potential measurement error problem
in the foreignness variable.
7.3 Long-difference model.
Long differencing (LD) is similar to first differencing except that instead
of taking difference of the variable with respect to the previous year, the
difference with respect to a year a longer period back is taken. For example,
like it will be done in this study, the difference between the last and the first
year with data available in the sample can be taken:
Πil−Πif = β1 · (fil− fif ) + γk · (xkil−xkif ) + (σl−σf ) + (εil− εif ) (5)
Also here the time invariant firm specific effects will be eliminated from
the model. When presenting the empirical results in the next section, the
results of the long differencing approach will be compared to the fixed effects
and first difference results to see if it is helpful in reducing the potential
attenuation bias.
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8 Empirical results.
8.1 Main regression results.
The results of estimations are presented in this section. The dependent vari-
able in all the regressions is taxable income to sales ratio, unless otherwise
specified. Alternative definitions of profitability will be tested in the sensi-
tivity checks section. First, the main four tables (tables 4, 5, 6 , 7 below) will
be presented with the results of the baseline regressions, based on a sample
as described above. These tables differ in the way the main explanatory
variable, foreignness, is defined.
In the first table, table 4, the foreignness variable (FCC) is defined in the
same way as in most of the earlier literature, among others Hægeland (2003)
and Langli and Saudagaran (2004). Namely, it covers foreign controlled com-
panies, while domestically controlled companies serve as a benchmark. The
idea is that the profitability differential between these two types of compa-
nies can reveal whether foreign controlled companies exercise their possibil-
ity to shift profits in or out of Norway via its foreign parent. Note however
that as it is defined now, both types of companies may have subsidiaries
abroad. This implies that both types of companies may also have incentives
to shift profits in or out of the country through their foreign subsidiaries.
This latter possibility is not accounted for if foreignness is defined as foreign
control, and this definition may thus introduce some noise in the effect that
is to be identified in the regression analysis. The results of the regressions
with foreign control as the main explanatory variables will be presented to
serve as a benchmark for further discussion, and use other definitions of for-
eignness for the main explanatory variables. In the second regression results
table, table 5, foreignness variable (MNC) is defined so that it contains
all the multinational companies that are either foreign controlled, or have
foreign subsidiaries or both. Only domestic companies, that are neither for-
eign controlled nor have controlling share in subsidiaries abroad, are left in
the control group (they will be referred to as pure domestic companies). In
table 6 all the firms in the sample are divided into 3 subgroups. The control
group still consists of purely domestic companies. The multinational firms
however are further divided into 2 subgroups. The first subgroup (FMNC)
contains those firms that are foreign controlled with or without foreign sub-
sidiaries (i.e. the same as in the case with foreign control variable in table
4). The second group (DMNC) is the group of domestically controlled
firms that have subsidiaries abroad (the group that have been a part of a
”control” group in table 4). This will allow us to see among other things
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Table 4: Main regressions.
(1) OLS (2) FE (3) FD (4) LD
FCC –.0339*** –.0191*** –.0058 –.0307***
(.002) (.003) (.004) (.008)
Long-term (int.) –.2725*** –.2304*** –.2677*** –.2626***
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.007)
Short-term (int.) –.2376*** –.1689*** –.2003*** –.1831***
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.008)
Short-term (non-int.) –.1145*** –.0936*** –.1119*** –.1203***
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.006)
Tangib. .0304*** –.0158*** –.0922*** –.0586***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.008)
Wage cost share –.0331*** –.0703*** .0114** –.0667***
(.003) (.005) (.005) (.011)
Sales –.0000*** –.0000*** .0000** –.0000**
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Sales2 .0000*** .0000*** –.0000*** .0000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Sales3 –.0000*** –.0000*** .0000** –.0000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Sales4 .0000*** .0000*** –.0000** .0000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Age .0050*** .0062*** .0000 .0043***
(.000) (.000) (.) (.001)
Age2 –.0002*** –.0000 –.0001*** .0001*
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Age3 .0000*** .0000 .0000*** –.0000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Age4 –.0000*** –.0000 –.0000** .0000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Constant .2656*** .1689*** .0058*** .0060***
(.017) (.003) (.000) (.002)
Year Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Eff. Yes No No No
Adj. R2 .237 .070 .049 .061
No. of obs. 657823 657823 521204 136619
In parentheses: robust SE corrected for clustering within firms.
Industry effects: dummies for NACE 3 digit codes
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.00126
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Table 5: Main regressions.
(1) OLS (2) FE (3) FD (4) LD
MNC –.0317*** –.0182*** –.0041 –.0230***
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.006)
Long-term (int.) –.2725*** –.2304*** –.2677*** –.2626***
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.005)
Short-term (int.) –.2379*** –.1689*** –.2003*** –.1832***
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.006)
Short-term (non-int.) –.1150*** –.0937*** –.1119*** –.1204***
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.005)
Tangib. .0301*** –.0158*** –.0922*** –.0586**
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.006)
Wage cost share –.0331*** –.0702*** .0114** –.0667***
(.003) (.005) (.005) (.009)
Sales –.0000*** –.0000*** .0000** –.0000***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Sales2 .0000*** .0000*** –.0000*** .0000**
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Sales3 –.0000*** –.0000*** .0000** –.0000**
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Sales4 .0000*** .0000*** –.0000** .0000**
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Age .0050*** .0062*** .0000 .0043***
(.000) (.000) (.) (.000)
Age2 –.0002*** –.0000* –.0001*** .0001
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Age3 .0000*** .0000 .0000*** –.0000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Age4 –.0000*** –.0000 –.0000** .0000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Constant .2663*** .1689*** .0058*** .0059***
(.017) (.003) (.000) (.002)
Year Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Eff. Yes No No No
Adj. R2 .237 .070 .049 .061
No. of obs. 657823 657823 521204 657823
In parentheses: robust SE corrected for clustering within firms.
Industry effects: dummies for NACE 3 digit codes
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.00127
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Table 6: Main regressions.
(1) OLS (2) FE (3) FD (4) LD
FMNC –.0343*** –.0197*** –.0057 –.0303***
(.002) (.003) (.004) (.008)
DMNC –.0126** –.0129** .0021 .0100
(.005) (.006) (.008) (.020)
Long-term (int.) –.2725*** –.2304*** –.2677*** –.2626***
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.007)
Short-term (int.) –.2375*** –.1688*** –.2003*** –.1831***
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.008)
Short-term (non-int.) –.1147*** –.0937*** –.1119*** –.1202***
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.006)
Tangib. .0302*** –.0158*** –.0922*** –.0586***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.008)
Wage cost share –.0331*** –.0702*** .0114** –.0667***
(.003) (.005) (.005) (.011)
Sales –.0000*** –.0000*** .0000** –.0000**
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Sales2 .0000*** .0000*** –.0000*** .0000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Sales3 –.0000*** –.0000*** .0000** –.0000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Sales4 .0000*** .0000*** –.0000** .0000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Age .0050*** .0062*** .0000 .0043***
(.000) (.000) (.) (.001)
Age2 –.0002*** –.0000* –.0001*** .0001*
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Age3 .0000*** .0000 .0000*** –.0000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Age4 –.0000*** –.0000 –.0000** .0000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Constant .2662*** .1689*** .0058*** .0060***
(.017) (.003) (.000) (.002)
Year Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Eff. Yes No No No
Adj. R2 .237 .070 .049 .061
No. of obs. 657823 657823 521204 136619
In parentheses: robust SE corrected for clustering within firms.
Industry effects: dummies for NACE 3 digit codes
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
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Table 7: Main regressions.
(1) OLS (2) FE (3) FD (4) LD
FCC+FDI –.0251** –.0356** –.0249** –.0943**
(.010) (.011) (.013) (.034)
FCC-FDI –.0345*** –.0189*** –.0048 –.0275***
(.002) (.003) (.004) (.008)
DMNC –.0125** –.0143** –.0006 .0038
(.005) (.007) (.008) (.020)
Long-term (int.) –.2725*** –.2304*** –.2677*** –.2626***
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.007)
Short-term (int.) –.2375*** –.1688*** –.2003*** –.1830***
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.008)
Short-term (non-int.) –.1147*** –.0937*** –.1119*** –.1203***
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.006)
Tangib. .0302*** –.0158*** –.0922*** –.0586***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.008)
Wage cost share –.0331*** –.0702*** .0114** –.0665***
(.003) (.005) (.005) (.011)
Sales –.0000*** –.0000*** .0000** –.0000**
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Sales2 .0000*** .0000*** –.0000*** .0000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Sales3 –.0000*** –.0000*** .0000** –.0000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Sales4 .0000*** .0000*** –.0000** .0000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Age .0050*** .0062*** .0000 .0043***
(.000) (.000) (.) (.001)
Age2 –.0002*** –.0000* –.0001*** .0001*
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Age3 .0000*** .0000 .0000*** –.0000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Age4 –.0000*** –.0000 –.0000** .0000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Constant .2662*** .1689*** .0058*** .0060***
(.017) (.003) (.000) (.002)
Year Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Eff. Yes No No No
Adj. R2 .237 .070 .049 .061
No. of obs. 657823 657823 521204 136619
In parentheses: robust SE corrected for clustering within firms.
Industry effects: dummies for NACE 3 digit codes
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
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Table 8: Main regressions.
(1) OLS (2) FE (3) FD (4) LD
FCC –.0239*** –.0188*** –.0058 –.0284***
(.002) (.003) (.004) (.008)
Long-term (int.) –.2764*** –.2306*** –.2627*** –.2610***
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.007)
Short-term (int.) –.2296*** –.1697*** –.1997*** –.1954***
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.008)
Short-term (non-int.) –.1036*** –.0924*** –.1168*** –.1214***
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.006)
Tangib. .0166*** –.0174*** –.0854*** –.0564***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.008)
Wage cost share –.0344*** –.0733*** .0171*** –.0713***
(.003) (.005) (.005) (.011)
SalesQ 2 –.0282*** .0116*** .0561*** .0511***
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.006)
SalesQ 3 –.0538*** .0053* .0797*** .0550***
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.006)
SalesQ 4 –.0631*** –.0059* .0950*** .0467***
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.007)
SalesQ 5 –.0750*** –.0256*** .1043*** .0321***
(.002) (.004) (.004) (.008)
Age gr. 2 .0235*** .0043*** –.0002 .0103***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.002)
Age gr. 3 .0338*** .0004 –.0008 .0261***
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.004)
Age gr. 4 .0390*** .0016 .0018 .0575***
(.001) (.003) (.002) (.007)
Constant .3061*** .2064*** .0041*** .0219***
(.017) (.003) (.000) (.002)
Year Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Eff. Yes No No No
Adj. R2 .245 .071 .055 .061
No. of obs. 657823 657823 521204 136619
In parentheses: robust SE corrected for clustering within firms.
Industry effects: dummies for NACE 3 digit codes
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
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whether the profitability differential is also characteristic for the important
group of domestically controlled Norwegian companies that have foreign di-
rect investments. In the next table, table 7, the group of FMNC companies
are further divided into those foreign controlled companies that have sub-
sidiaries abroad themselves and those that do not. This allows investigate
directly the possibility of profit shifting through the parent company. Also
here, pure domestic firms will serve as a benchmark category.
Pooled OLS results: Since better classification of multinational firms is one
of the important contributions of this study, I start with comparing coef-
ficients for the different foreignness variables. It is interesting to look at
the OLS coefficient for FCC-variable in table 4 (used in most of the previ-
ous studies) in comparison to that of MNC-variable in table 5. The main
difference between the two is that the coefficient for the latter is meant to
capture the differential between the multinational companies compared to
purely domestic companies, while in the former case the comparison group
includes also those domestically controlled companies that may have sub-
sidiaries abroad. The difference between the coefficients for FCC and MNC
of around 0.22 percentage points indicates that domestically controlled com-
panies with subsidiaries abroad are on average more profitable than foreign
controlled companies, but still less profitable than pure domestic companies,
which is also evident from the summary statistics table. Table 6 confirms
this result: here it can be seen that when domestic companies with foreign
direct investments (DMNC) are included as a separate group, the coefficient
for the corresponding variable is negative, but almost 3 times lower in size
than the coefficient for FMNC. This result indicates also that these are the
foreign controlled firms in Norway that drive the negative differential found
in the data. With the data available, it is possible to go even one more step
further and see whether these are foreign controlled companies with or with-
out foreign subsidiaries abroad that affect the coefficient for FMNC in table
6 most. From table 7 one can see that the coefficients for both FCC+FDI
(foreign controlled with subsidiaries) and FCC-FDI (foreign controlled with-
out subsidiaries) are negative and statistically significant. However, this is
the latter group of foreign controlled firms without foreign subsidiaries that
seems to drive the result. This may indicate that if the differential is really
caused by profit shifting activities, profit shifting through the foreign parent
can be an important channel.
To sum up, the OLS coefficients indicate that profitability of foreign con-
trolled firms in Norway is on average 3.39 percentage points lower than prof-
itability of comparable domestic firms. This result is comparable to the 2.6
31
SNF Working Paper No 05/10
percentage points negative differential reported in Langli and Saudagaran
(2004) (a more thorough comparison of the results to the results in existing
Norwegian studies will be presented below). When comparing the multina-
tional firms in Norway (i.e. those that are foreign controlled as well as those
that are domestically controlled but engage in outward foreign direct invest-
ments) to those of pure domestic companies in Norway, the difference is also
negative and lies at around 3.17 percentage points. Domestic multinational
companies are also reported to show lower profitability than their pure do-
mestic counterparts, however, with negative difference being slightly lower:
1.26 percentage points. Of the foreign controlled companies, those without
subsidiaries abroad seem to be even less profitable as compared to their pure
domestic counterparts than foreign controlled companies with subsidiaries
abroad (with negative profitability differentials of -3.5 and -2.5 percentage
points correspondingly).
Panel data methods results: Next, it would be interesting to take a look
at the coefficients from the regressions which were estimated using panel
data methods. The results of these estimations are to be found in columns
(2), (3) and (4) in each of the tables 4, 5, 6, 7. I start with the fixed ef-
fects (FE) coefficients which are statistically significant and negative in all
the tables, independent on which definition of foreignness used. The main
advantage from using this approach is that it makes it possible to get rid of
the differences in profitability changes between these two groups that can
be caused by permanent differences between the groups. The negative coef-
ficient of 1.82 for MNC variable (column (2) in table 5) implies for example
that the difference between the after and before profitability of the firms
that changed their foreignness status and change in profitability of the firms
that have not changed their status in the same period is negative and lies
at 1.82 percentage points. This means with other words that firms that
change their status and become multinational show lower profitability than
the firms that remain domestic. It is especially the firms that have been
taken over by foreigners that show the largest reduction in profitability (-
1.97 percentage points).
FE coefficients are also almost always lower (in absolute terms) than the
corresponding OLS coefficient for the foreign controlled firms, i.e. OLS co-
efficient seems to overstate the differential in absolute terms. It may indicate
that firm specific effects that are not accounted for in OLS, but are taken
care of in FE are negatively correlated with the foreignness variable. This
would mean that these are the least efficient and productive firms that are
being taken over by foreigners (see coefficients for FCC in table 4 and FMNC
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in table 5). However, this may also be a consequence of measurement er-
ror in the foreignness variable, caused by the differences in timing between
the actual and reported change in foreignness status. The FE estimate will
then be lower than the OLS estimate because of the attenuation bias that
becomes even stronger due to the FE transformation. The results in table
7 columns (1) and (2), on the other hand, seem to confirm cherry picking
hypothesis for the group of foreign controlled companies with subsidiaries
abroad. For them FE coefficient is more negative than the OLS coefficient
(-0.0356 vs. -0.0251) indicating that there may be some unobserved char-
acteristics these firms possess that may make them more attractive targets
for foreign takeover. FE coefficient for the DMNC variable (table 6 col-
umn (2)) lies at around -1.29 percentage points and is significant at least
at 5% significance level. It is only 0.03 percentage points lower than the
corresponding OLS coefficient. The FE coefficient shows that domestically
controlled firms become less profitable after they change their status to be-
ing domestic multinational firms. A small negative difference between the
OLS and FE coefficients indicates that firm specific effects seem to play quite
limited role in the decision of the companies to extend abroad, however, it
still confirms the expectations in accordance with internationalization the-
ory of the firm that says that these are the most productive firms that have
a possibility and motivation to extend abroad.
When looking at the results of the the first difference (FD) estimations,
the first thing to notice is that the coefficients for the foreignness variables
are never shown to be statistically significant at any conventional signifi-
cance levels and are small in size too (less than 1 percentage points). The
only exception is the coefficient for the FCC+FDI (foreign controlled with
subsidiaries) variable (column (3) table 7). In this case the FD coefficient is
negative, significant at 5% level, and comparable in size to the coefficients
from OLS and FE estimations.
The long difference (LD) estimates (columns (4) in tables 4, 5, 6, 7) are
all negative and statistically significant, in size being somewhere in between
the OLS and FE coefficients, except for the table 7, where LD coefficient
for the variable (FCC+FDI) is almost 3 times larger than the corresponding
FE coefficient. Since this coefficient is so much higher than the rest of the
coefficients, and since the number of firms in this category (FCC+FDI) is
limited, it may be necessary to consider it with caution.
The idea with long difference estimations was to address potential measure-
ment problem in the main explanatory variable. The expectation was that
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the problem maybe worsened due to the transformations made in FE and
FD models, and thus cause a severe attenuation bias in the coefficients. The
LD coefficients are indeed higher in absolute terms than those reported from
FE and FD estimations. They are also shown to be statistically significant
for all the foreignness variables (except for DMNC, for which they are small
in size but positive and never statistically significant at any of the conven-
tional levels). This is consistent with the concern regrading the presence of
measurement errors in the foreignness variable. Since the source of the error
lies mainly in the timing of reporting of the status change, removing the
years around it (for example the year of status change as well as one year
before and after it has taken place) can be considered when estimating the
model. This issue will however be left for future research.
The coefficients from the FD and FE estimations were not expected to be
very close to each other since the number of periods in the analysis is bigger
than two. However, they could be more similar to each other than what is
observed (compare columns (2) and (3) in tables 4, 5, 6, 7). As mentioned
shortly in the estimation model-section, this latter inconsistency can among
other things indicate that the ”treatment effects” to be estimated are not
constant over time. Laporte and Windmeijer (2005) argue that in this case
more flexible specification may be needed to capture the dynamics of the
effect. This will allow to account for the fact that the effect on profitability
of change in status may happen over time rather than causing an immediate
change. This is an important and interesting issue that will be left for for
future research.
Another important things to be aware is that since the coefficients in fixed ef-
fects and first difference models are identified only for the firms that changed
their status at least once, it does not tell us much about the difference in
profitability between the firms that remained domestic and those that re-
mained foreign through the whole period of study (for example it implies
that the data on greenfield foreign direct investments in Norway are not
used to identify the FE coefficients). For the number of firms that change
their status during the period of study and thus are used to identify the FE
and FD coefficients, see table 9 below.
In the rest of the paper, only the OLS and FE coefficients will be pre-
sented (because of the issues discussed above, but also because the reported
FD standard errors may be incorrect in the case were error term is not ran-
dom walk; and because LD is less efficient estimator since it does not utilize
information about the change in foreignness status of the firms).
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Table 9: Transitions from one category to another (within firms over time).
Transition Number of changes
FCC =⇒ DCC 1 078
DCC =⇒ FCC 2 562
MNC =⇒ DNC 1 375
DNC =⇒ MNC 3 037
FMNC =⇒ DMNC 48
DMNC =⇒ FMNC 128
DNC =⇒ FMNC 2 434
FMNC =⇒ DNC 1 030
DNC =⇒ DMNC 603
DMNC =⇒ DNC 345
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Control variables.
So far only the coefficients for the foreignness variables have been com-
mented. When it concerns the rest of the variables, the signs of their co-
efficients are as expected. The coefficients for leverage variables (interest-
bearing debt, both short- and long-term debt) are all negative and highly
significant. This is as expected as interest payments on debt reduce tax-
able income. The coefficient for the short-term non-interest bearing debt is
smaller in scale than the coefficients for the two other leverage variables, but
still negative. The reason for that is not entirely straightforward. The OLS
coefficient for the tangibility variable is positive, while it is negative when
the model is estimated by the panel data methods (FE, FD, LD). The pos-
itive coefficient for the tangibility means that on average, those with higher
share of tangible assets are shown to be more profitable. It can reflect the
fact that it can be easier and cheaper to borrow for the highly tangible firms,
since their tangible assets can be used as a collateral. Better access to funds
can further make it easier for these firms to involve in bigger and more prof-
itable projects. When observing within-firm changes, negative FE coefficient
indicates that the firms that become more tangible tend to also become less
profitable. This can capture the effect that increase in tangible assets due
to acquiring new assets by the firm is associated with higher depreciation
allowances that reduce taxable income. The coefficients for the wage cost
share variable (both OLS and FE) are negative, which is as expected since
wage costs reduce profitability. When age group dummies are used as a
control for age in regressions (table 8 3), one can see that their coefficients
(with the youngest age group excluded) are all positive, indicating that the
older and more mature firms tend to report higher profitability. The FE
coefficients for the age dummies are also positive. Two of them are also not
shown to be statistically significant. One of the explanations for that can
be that these variables are not properly identified in that it can be too little
variation in them (change with the same amount each year). When fourth
order polynoms in age are used as controls for maturity of the firms (tables
4, 5, 6, 7), profitability seem to increase with age up to a certain point,
decline as firm gets older and go up and down again in the later years (life
cycle hypothesis of the firms). The coefficients for the age polynom variables
3This table is added for the purpose of illustrating the effect of an alternative set of
control variables, which in this table are similar to the ones used in Langli and Saudagaran
(2004)
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are all significant and consistent for both OLS and FE. The age polynoms
variables will be used as age controls in all the tables below.
The OLS coefficients for the size-dummy variables (with the dummy for the
lowest size quintile excluded) are all significant and negative (table 8). If the
differential reported is at least partly attributed to profit shifting activities,
this may reflect the fact that bigger firms may have more incentives and
possibilities to involve in activities that may help them reduce their taxable
income. For example they can afford hiring consultants and lawyers that
can help them with tax planning. The FE coefficients for the size-dummy
variables were positive only for for the first two dummies, indicating that
as the firm grows its profitability increase only up to a certain point. When
polynoms of fourth order in sales are used as controls for size (as in ta-
bles 4, 5, 6, 7), their coefficients reveal that profitability initially falls with
size to then go up, it decline again after a certain turnover is reached and
goes down with size thereafter. All the polynom sales variables are highly
significant, indicating that this may be good approximation for the rela-
tionship between size and profitability. This is the size control that will be
used throughout the paper from here on, unless specified otherwise. In the
sensitivity checks-section effects of these and other alternatives for size con-
trols on the foreignness variables estimates will be discussed in further detail.
Comparison to previous Norwegian studies: Table 10 below reproduces co-
efficients for the foreignness variables from the previously discussed tables
(tables 4, 5, 6, 7) (all the control variables are omitted from the table, even
though they are still included in the regressions). In addition, in the top
panels (I, II, III) of table 10 the results of the regressions based on spec-
ifications used in the other two existing Norwegian studies: by Hægeland
(2003) and Langli and Saudagaran (2004) are reported. This makes it easier
to compare the estimates presented there and in this study. Note that only
OLS estimates were reported in both of these studies, and only FCC vari-
able was used in their regressions. All the regressions for which the results
are presented in this table are run on a sample as described in the ”The
data sets and sample”-section above. The specification in the first panel in
the table (FCC (Hægeland (2003)) includes controls for size of the firms (in
form of dummies for each of the quintiles the firms were divided into based
on sales, total assets and number of employees), as well as 2 digit NACE
industry dummies, time dummies and dummies for the county where the
firm is located. Return on capital (calculated as ratio of operating income
plus financial revenue to total assets) is used as a dependent variable. The
second panel differs from the first one only in the variables used as foreign-
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ness control. In panel II, three dummies included instead of one general for
foreign control. The dummies indicate whether the firm is owned with own-
ership share of 10 to 49%, 50 to 99% or wholly owned by a foreign parent.
This is similar to what it have been done in Hægeland (2003). The specifi-
cation in the third panel (FCC (Langli and Saudagaran (2004))) in table 10
is similar to the one in this study, and includes controls for size (dummies
for sales based quintiles), age (4 groups as described above), leverage ratio
(long-term interest-bearing debt), tangibility, year dummies and dummies
for each of the 10 group industries. As it can be seen from table 10, the
OLS coefficient for the FCC variable is highly significant and negative for
both Hægeland (2003) (panel I and II table 10) and Langli and Saudagaran
(2004) (panel III) specifications, as well as for the specification in the study
(panel IV). It is the highest (most negative) in the Hægeland specification,
and especially for the foreign controlled firms that are wholly owned. It is
surprising, since the results reported in his study show that the profitabil-
ity of foreign controlled firms is on the contrary higher than profitability
of the comparable domestically controlled firms, as implied by the positive
coefficients. This is however not entirely unexpected, since the samples the
regressions are run on differ between his study and ours. Additionally indi-
cator variables for whether the firm belongs to a bigger corporate group and
if so, if it is then a subsidiary or a parent company were used in his study.
To the best of our knowledge these variables only exist for foreign owned
firms4. This implies that the full effect of foreign ownership on profitability
in Hægelands study cannot be determined without knowing the coefficients
on these variables, but unfortunately they are not reported. When the
regression on our sample was run including these indicator variables, the
coefficients for the foreignness variable reported were much more similar to
that in Hægeland (2003), mostly insignificant, partly positive, while the cor-
porate group indicator variable drove the negative and significant result as
reported in this study. Since it could not be confirmed whether the variables
used in Hægeland (2003) are exactly the ones described above, and because
no straightforward rationale was found for including it in the regressions,
we omit reporting the corresponding results here. We still consider this to
be one of the potential explanations to the contradicting results he reports.
Since information on the limiting restrictions applied to the sample was not
available, it can also be possible that the results in his paper could be driven
by the big number of smaller companies that report quite ”noisy” data, and
that are excluded from the sample in Langli and Saudagaran (2004) as well
4The variables seem to be based on the ftype information in the SIFON register
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as from this study.
The results for the Langli and Saudagaran (2004) as estimated on the sam-
ple are more similar to the ones reported in their paper (-0.022 vs -0.026).
This is despite the fact that they have done their estimations on a limited
sample of only 4 years and 3 industries. So the results found in this study
indicate that the negative differential they found seems to persist also in
the extended 13 years time period and for a sample of all industries (ex-
cept mining and quarrying). In the next subsections the attention will be
focused on the development of the differential over time, as well as on how
the differential differs across the industries.
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Table 10: Regressions based on specifications from earlier studies.
(1) OLS (2) FE (3) Obs.
I. FCC –.0576*** –.0357*** 369 791
(Hægeland (2003)) (.003) (.005)
II. FCC share 10-49% –0.0242*** –0.009 369 791
(0.006) (0.007)
FCC share 50-99% –0.0446*** -0.0175**
(0.006) (0.008)
FCC share 100% –0.0620*** -0.0398***
(Hægeland (2003)) (0.004) (0.007)
III. FCC –.0217*** –.0129*** 657 823
(Langli and Saudagaran (2004)) (.002) (.003)
IV. FCC –.0339*** –.0191*** 657 823
(.002) (.003)
Control var. Yes Yes
Year Eff. Yes Yes
Industry Eff. Yes No
In parentheses: robust SE corrected for clustering within firms.
Industry effects: dummies for NACE 3 digit codes
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
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8.2 Regressions by years.
Table 11 above shows development of the profitability differential (as esti-
mated by OLS) over time for several foreignness variables: MNC, FMNC
and DMNC, as well as for the foreign controlled companies divided into those
that have and do not have subsidiaries abroad. In all cases pure domestic
companies are served as a comparison category. As it can be seen from
the table below the differentials for MNC and FMNC seem to be relatively
stable over years, the former being driven by the latter. FMNC coefficient
seems in turn to be driven by the firms that are foreign controlled and do
not have subsidiaries abroad. The coefficients for all three of these variables
are negative in all years and lie at around 2-3 percentage points in most
of the years (being higher in 1993, 1994, 2003 and 2004). The differential
seems to show no clear trend, however it may seem to be increasing in the
5 last years of the panel. It can be related to the fact that number of multi-
national companies has increased rapidly in these years, and the quality of
data has improved. Additionally, if it can be expected that the differential is
really caused by profit-shifting activities, its increase can also be explained
by the fact that new and more sophisticated methods for tax planning and
tax evasion could have been developed in more recent years, as well as the
supply of professionals and consultants that help companies to find ways to
hide their profits has increased. The DMNC differential fluctuates a lot, and
is insignificant in some of the years, something can among other things be
explained by the low number of the companies in this category.
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8.3 Regressions by industry.
Tables 12 and 13 below show how profitability differentials differ across the
industries. There are in total 8 separate industry groups with at least 20
000 observations each, and one group for all the industries for which there
were less than 20 000 observations in the sample. The results in the first
two columns ((OLS) and (FE)) correspond to those reported earlier for the
full sample in tables 5, 6 and 7.
The profitability differential is reported to be negative and significant for
all the industry groups considered, except for Retail industry, for which
the coefficients are not economically nor statistically significant. This is
an interesting result since the corresponding differential was found to be
significant in Langli and Saudagaran (2004). Further investigation showed
that the main reason for this divergence lies in the controls introduced in
the model, among others a more flexible control for size of the firms. The
highest differentials in profitability between the multinational and domestic
companies (as estimated by both OLS and FE) is reported for ”Real Es-
tate/Finace/Business activities” and ”Hotels/Restaurants”. The result for
the ”Hotels/restaurants” group should however be taken with some caution,
since number of MNC in this industry group is relatively small (381 obser-
vations over all the years, which is also less than 2% of all the companies in
this sector). The latter group (”Real estate/Finace/Business activities”) is
better represented by multinational companies (8 421 firm-year observations
which account for around 4% of all firms in this sector). It is also interest-
ing to look at, since many of the companies in this group are R&D-intensive
companies. Also in general many of the products in this industry group
are intangible in nature. This can give these firms better opportunities to
involve in transfer pricing manipulations, since it can be difficult to find a
comparable market price for the goods and services they produce. So the
result that the differential is relatively high for the firms in this industry
group can be consistent with that profitability differential can at least to a
certain degree caused by profit shifting activities.
FE coefficients reported for the pooled sample of all industries seem to be
mainly driven by four industry groups, namely ”Wholesale”, ”Hotel/Restaurants”,
”Real Estate/Finace/Business activities” and ”Others”. For the first two of
these industry groups the FE coefficients are negative, significant (at 5%
level for ”Hotels/Restaurants”), and higher in absolute value than the OLS
coefficients. In the ”Wholesale” sector, the profitability seem to go down as
result of change to becoming FMNC as well as to becoming a DMNC. Only
change to FMNC-status (but not DMNC) seems to bring along reduction in
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profitability for the firms in ”Hotels/Restaurants” sector. The size of OLS
and FE coefficients relative to each other for these two industries may indi-
cate that there can be a ”positive selection” into becoming a multinational
company in this industries (i.e. these are the most productive firms that
become multinational). The ”Wholesale”-industry is interesting to look at
since it is the industry, where the multinational companies represent the
highest proportion of all the companies compared to the other industries
(share of the multinational companies in the wholesale sector is appr.18%
(15 096 observations)). The FE coefficients for MNC, and FMNC variables
for the companies in ”Real Estate/Finace/Business activities” are also neg-
ative and significant.
Also representation of multinational companies in manufacturing sector is
quite high (around 8% of all the manufacturing firms). The OLS results
indicate that profitability differential is negative and significant also in this
industry, even though differential as driven solely by FMNC, being lower in
absolute terms than in the sample as a whole. The results of FE regressions
indicate that no significant change in profitability happens when manufac-
turing terms shift their foreignness status, independent of whether it is a
change to FMNC or DMNC is considered.
Profitability differential for the DMNC for the other industries is also worth
commenting on. At closer look, significant and negative differential (as es-
timated by both OLS and FE) that is reported for the full sample seem
to be driven by the firms in 2 industry groups: ”Wholesale” (as already
mentioned above) and the group of companies that are collected under the
”Other industries”. The differential as estimated by OLS is reported to be
positive for the following industry groups: ”Hotels/Restaurants” (around
3 percentage points, but not statistically significant); ”Transport” indus-
try group, being statistically significant at 5% level, and ”Retail” industry,
where coefficient for DMNC (significant at 5% level) reveals that domestic
multinational companies report on average 6.34 percentage points higher
profitability than comparable pure domestic firms.
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8.4 Regressions by size groups.
Here the firms has been divided into 5 quintile groups, based on the average
sales of firms over years. The firms with sales between 2 thousand and 2
million NOK correspond to the first sales quantile. In the second quantile
there are firms that have average sales of between 2.1 and 4.7 million NOK.
The firms with average sales more than 4.7, but less than 8.9 million NOK
belong to the third quantile. The fourth quantile is for the firms with av-
erage sales between 8.9 and 20 million NOK. In the fifth quantile there are
firms with between 20 million and 34.8 billion NOK in sales. It is interesting
to note (see table 14) that number of multinational firms gets bigger as one
moves from the 1st to the 5th quantile, so that the number of multinational
companies is the biggest in the last, fifth, quantile (moreover there are more
multinational companies in the fifth quintile group than it is in total in the
first four quantiles). The results in table 14 indicate that the differential
is negative and statistically significant for all the sales quantiles when esti-
mated by OLS. It is the largest (in absolute value) for the first sales quantile
group, where the OLS coefficient lies at -9.68 percentage points. The differ-
ential then goes down in absolute value as one moves up to the fifth quantile.
If the differentials reported can be caused by the profit shifting activities,
this result here may indicate then that smaller companies as well as the
big ones, and possibly even in a bigger degree, may involve in tax evasion
activities. However, the results may also be due to low representation of
multinational companies in the lowest quintiles. Looking at the differentials
as estimated by FE instead, reveals however that the FE coefficients for the
first two lowest sales quantiles are not statistically significant. The differen-
tials as estimated by FE are negative and significant for the 3rd, 4th and 5th
quantile groups. The FE coefficient for the third sales quantile group lies at
around - 2.5 percentage points, this is the highest differential as estimated
by FE. In general this indicates that only companies that have average sales
of more than 5 million NOK and change their status from being domes-
tic to being multinational (in particular FMNC) report systematically lower
profitability than comparable companies that have not changed their status.
For domestic multinational companies the differentials are mostly negative
and largely insignificant. The exception are the OLS and FE coefficients
for the second quintile that are positive (at 5.44 and 8.52 percentage points
correspondingly) and significant at 5% level, thus indicating that for the
companies in this size range firms that are domestically controlled report
higher profitability than comparable pure domestic firm.
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8.5 Extensions and sensitivity checks.
8.5.1 Alternative definitions of profitability measures.
In all the regressions above, taxable income to sales was used as a mea-
sure of profitability. To rule out the possibility that the differential found
is characteristic to this particular measure used, the results reported above
will be tested using alternative measures, which are taxable income to total
assets ratio (TI/TA); return on capital as used in Hægeland (2003), defined
as a ratio of operating income and financial revenues to total assets; and
operating margin (measured as a ratio of operating profit to sales). The
regressions here are run on a sample where extreme values for each of the
three new variables were excluded. The regression using the TI/Sales ratio
as a dependent variable is re-run on this new sample, in order to make sure
that the results above are not driven by the excluded observations. From
table 15 it can be seen that both OLS and FE coefficients for MNC variables
are negative and highly significant for all the specifications, implying that
independent of which measure of profitability is used, multinational compa-
nies in Norway tend to be on average systematically less profitable. There is
also a systematic reduction in profitability associated with change in status
from being domestic to becoming multinational independent of which mea-
sure is used. Difference in profitability between multinational and domestic
companies when measured as a ratio of taxable income to total assets (col-
umn (2)), is reported to be negative and significant, and is slightly higher
in absolute terms than the differential as estimated for the taxable income
to sales ratio. Grubert (1997) argues however this measure can be prob-
lematic. The assets values reported may be misleading for the purpose of
comparing firms because of the problems of assets revaluations arising as
a result of mergers and acquisitions activities.The OLS differential lies at
-2.84 percentage points when profitability is measured in terms of operating
margin (column (4)). The FE estimate of the differential is at -1.6 percent-
age point and also significant. This is the smallest estimate compared to the
results based on other measures (which is consistent with finding in Grubert
(1997)). It is also considerably smaller than what can be observed in raw
data (see table 3). Further calculations show that as much as 84% of the dif-
ferential observed in raw data, measured in terms of operating margin, can
be explained by differences in observable and time invariant characteristics
between multinational and domestic firms. The differential is however still
highly significant, which is an interesting result because operating margin
can provide a more direct way to reveal transfer price manipulations, since
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it focuses on operating items that are most likely to be directly affected
by transfer prices. This is also a profit indicator that is used in compara-
ble profit method (CPM) of analysis conducted in order test (indirectly) if
transfer prices set by firms deviate from arm length prices. However, tax-
able income was chosen as a denominator for the main part of the analysis
since it is expected that given the differential found is due to profit shifting
activities, there may be more than just transfer price manipulations that lie
behind it. In addition taxable income provide a direct link to the estimate of
taxes paid by the firms, or taxes foregone by government, which is the figure
of ultimate interest. When return on capital is used as a profitability mea-
sure (column (3)) both the OLS and FE coefficients for the MNC variable
highly significant and negative and comparable in size to the ones reported
in the regression where taxable income to sales is used as a dependent vari-
able. Given the differential calculated based on raw data, this implies that
while around 68% of the differential as measured by taxable income to sales
can be explained by various firm characteristics, the ”explained part” of the
differential as measured in terms of return to capital does not exceed 35%.
It can also be mentioned that FE coefficients for the DMNC variable are
lower than the corresponding OLS coefficients (around 1 percentage points
lower) for the cases where return to capital, operating income or taxable
income to total assets ratio has been used as profitability measures. The
two are however quite similar, implying only slightly positive omitted bias
in the OLS coefficient when taxable income is scaled by sales.
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8.5.2 Alternative controls for the size of the firms.
Different variations of controls for size of the firms are tested against each
other in this section. It is important to be sure that an appropriate measure
is used since firms in the sample are highly heterogeneous with respect to
size. So far, a flexible specification form for the size variables has been used,
namely fourth order polynoms in sales (column (2) Table 16). Alternative
definitions of size controls that are used in the specifications are sales quin-
tiles (dummies corresponding to each of the quintiles, as used in Langli and
Saudagaran (2004) and Hægeland (2003)), logarithm of sales, as well as capi-
tal quintiles dummies, fourth order polynoms in capital, logarithm of capital
and number of employees. Even though OLS coefficients for the foreignness
variables vary in size (ranging from 2.0 to 6.6 percentage points), all of them
are negative and highly significant. The FE estimates of the differential are
also all negative, significant, but quite similar independent of which specifi-
cation is chosen. The results observed in table 16 indicate further that the
differential seems to be higher in absolute value when the size is controlled
for in terms of capital rather than in terms of sales. However, the sales are
still preferred as a control for size because of the assets re-evalutaion issues
mentioned above. When dummies for the number of employees divided into
quintiles is used as a control for the size of the firm, the differential seem to
be quite similar to that when dummies for sales quintiles are used as con-
trols. Since there is a considerable number of firms in the sample that miss
data on the number of employees, sales-based measure of size was preferred
to it in the main regressions above. While FMNC coefficients from both
OLS and FE regressions are always negative and significant and seem to
drive the MNC result, the OLS coefficients for the DMNC turn insignificant
when sales quintiles, logarithm of sales or number of employees quintiles are
used as controls.
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8.5.3 Differences in ownership share.
So far, the company was considered as foreign controlled if at least 50% of
its shares were owned by foreign investor. Similarly a company was consid-
ered to have control over a foreign subsidiary if its ownership share in the
subsidiary exceeded 50%. Dummies for whether the companies were foreign
controlled or had controlling share in foreign subsidiaries were then used in
the regression analysis. This means that companies that were owned with
less than 50% were a part of the control group. There can be reasons to
believe that also firms with lower ownership share than 50% (foreign owned
firms rather than foreign controlled) still can have possibilities and incentives
to involve in profit shifting activities. This would mean that the coefficients
reported above for the foreign controlled and domestic multinational compa-
nies would be understated. The degree to which they would be understated
will depend on the extent of potential profit shifting activities of foreign
owned companies. This is again under the assumption that negative prof-
itability differential found is at least partly due to these type of activities.
Experimenting with the different ownership shares can however allow testing
this assumption, at least to a certain degree. The idea is that if differen-
tial is somehow related to profit shifting activities, one would expect it to be
most pronounced, if not limited to those firms that are majority owned from
abroad or those that own majority of shares in foreign firms. This type of
”test” is also used in Grubert (1997) who includes a dummy variable for the
companies with ownership share between 25 and 50 in addition to the one
based on controlling share. His results indicate that the differential for the
companies controlled with lower than 50% share show same low profitability
as wholly owned companies. This makes him to contemplate whether other
reasons than profit-shifting can lie behind the differential too.
Also Hægeland (2003), as discussed shortly above, have used dummies for
the different intervals of ownership share in the regressions. His results indi-
cated however that all foreign owned companies, independent of ownership
share, have systematically higher profitability than comparable domestically
controlled companies. As reported above, table 10, replicating his specifi-
cation and running it on sample used in this study have led to all nega-
tive, rather than positive differentials. Here, the findings from the main
part above will be tested by inclusion of dummies with different ownership
shares in the original specification reported above. All the results of this
modification are presented in table 17 below. The table is divided into 4
panels. In the first two panels the results of the basic regressions from the
main part are reproduced. The third panel includes foreignness dummies for
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foreign owned firms and domestically owned multinational firms, for which
threshold for foreignness was set to 10% (the definition of foreign direct in-
vestment). In the fourth, and last panel three dummies for foreign control
are introduced in the regression instead of one as in the panels above: one
for the companies that are owned with foreign share between 10 and 49%,
one for those owned with 50 to 99%, and one for the wholly owned sub-
sidiaries. The same is done on the outward FDI side: i.e. three dummies
based on the same ownership share groups are included instead of a single
dummy. The results reported generally point in the direction that the dif-
ferential can be caused by profit-shifting activities. FMNC coefficient in the
third panel, table 17, is just slightly more negative than the corresponding
coefficient in the second panel. This indicates that firms owned with foreign
share between 10 and 50%, that are now moved from the control into the
”treated” group, were on average less profitable than pure domestic compa-
nies. The difference however seems to be relatively small. Comparing the
FE coefficients for FMNC from the second and third panels indicate that
change to foreign ownership is associated with profitability decrease, and
the decrease is larger when the foreign control share of exceeds 50%. On the
outward FDI side, no systematic differences in profitability are found be-
tween domestically controlled multinational firms and domestic firms, when
foreign ownership is defined using a 10% threshold. Similarly no systematic
changes in profitability are found in connection to change to DMNC status
under the 10% ownership definition. The results in the last panel of table 17
show that independent of ownership share, all foreign owned firms seem to
report systematically lower profitability. Generally, however, the differential
seems to decline in absolute size as ownership share decreases, and is the
lowest for the firms owned with between 10 and 49% share. Transfer of for-
eign ownership status into each of this category is associated with decrease
in profitability, with decrease being largest for the fully owned foreign sub-
sidiaries. Firms that have received foreign direct investments of less than
50% show no systematic difference in profitability after the investment has
taken place. This is an important results, which is consistent with the profit
shifting hypothesis as described above. On the outward side, the positive
and economically significant OLS coefficient for DIA5 10-49% indicates that
firms in this category are on average more profitable than comparable do-
mestic firms. Those firms that are controlled with more than 50% are on
the contrary less profitable. However, none of the coefficients for dummies
on the outward FDI side (neither OLS nor FE) are statistically significant.
5DIA stands for Direct Investment Abroad
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Table 17: Experiments with ownership share.
(1) OLS (2) FE
I. MNC –.0317*** –.0182***
(.002) (.003)
II. FMNC (50%) –.0343*** –.0197***
(.002) (.003)
DMNC (50%) –.0126** –.0129**
(.005) (.006)
III. FMNC (10%) –.0348*** –.0159***
(.002) (.003)
DMNC (10%) –.0070 –.0057
(.006) (.010)
IV. FCC share 10-49% –.0274*** –.0079
(.005) (.006)
FCC share 50-99% –.0306*** –.0113**
(.004) (.005)
FCC share 100% –.0365*** –.0229***
(.002) (.005)
DIA share 10-49% .0231 –.0244
(.019) (.017)
DIA share 50-99% –.0112 .0081
(.011) (.012)
DIA share 100% –.0061 –.0080
(.007) (.007)
Control var. Yes Yes
Year Eff. Yes Yes
Industry Eff. Yes No
Adj. R2 .237 .070
No. of obs. 657 823 657 823
In parentheses: robust SE corrected for clustering within firms.
Industry effects: dummies for NACE 3 digit codes
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
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8.5.4 Changes in foreignness status.
All the regressions above are based on a sample where firms change their
foreignness status both from being domestic to being multinational and back
from being multinational to being domestic, as well as they can go from one
category to another several times. This may introduce noise and complicate
interpretation of the FE estimates, which are based on comparing the aver-
age after- and before-profitability of the firms upon the status change. It can
be seen from table 18 how the coefficients are affected if the regressions are
run on a sample where only firms that changed foreignness maximum one
time are included: column (2). Comparing the results from columns (1) and
(2) shows that FE coefficient has increased in absolute terms with almost
0.3 percentage points after the firms with multiple changes in foreignness
status has been removed. Furthermore, the sample has been limited to only
those firms that either have not changed their status at all or changed their
status from being domestic to becoming multinational (but not the other
way around). The results of regressions based on that sample are presented
in column (3) table 18. It is especially interesting to look at these results in
comparison to those in column (4), which are based on a sample with only
firms that either did not change their foreignness status at all or changed
it from being multinational to being domestic. FE coefficient in column (3)
reveals that profitability of the firms that changed their foreignness status
from being domestic to being multinational goes down as compared to the
firms that have not experienced a corresponding change. However, no sys-
tematic changes in profitability is found for the firms that became domestic
after being multinational (column (4)). Further comparison of the FE co-
efficients from columns (1) and (3) implies that the results of the original
regressions are driven by the domestic firms that became multinational, and
to a bigger degree by those that were taken over by foreigners (FMNC), and
to a lesser degree by those domestic firms that opened foreign subsidiaries
abroad (DMNC).
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8.5.5 Introducing taxes in the model.
That the differential found is due to tax motivated profit shifting behavior
by multinationals was an implicit assumption made here as well as in most
of the earlier studies following the same approach. In this section I will in-
troduce taxes in the model in order to see whether the differentials reported
can be related to taxes rather than other factors 6. Incorporating taxes in
the model like the one here is not entirely straightforward. On the inward
FDI side this is due to the fact that the data does not allow observing the
full structure of the corporate group the firm belongs to. If one looks at the
subsidiary of the foreign firm in Norway (FMNC), the data is available on
where the parent company of this firm is located; however, it is not known
what other countries this parent have subsidiaries in. This means that even
though tax rates of the parent may be included in the analysis, they may
have only limited effect on the taxable income reported in Norway. The
reported profits may rather be related to the tax rates in other affiliated
companies, some of which can be located in tax havens, and thus serve as
a more attractive destinations for shifted profits. In the absence of better
options, however, in this section the information on the tax rates of the
parent companies will still be used as regressor in the model where taxable
income to sales ratio of foreign controlled companies (FMNC) is used a de-
pendent variable (column (1), top panel in table 19). The regressions here
are run on a sample of 14 594 firm-year observations for foreign controlled
firms for which the parent country was reported and tax data on the parent
company was available. Neither of the two tax rate coefficients are shown
to be statistically significant at any conventional significance level. One of
the explanations for that can be relatively low variation in tax rates across
the countries as well as over time. The list of countries foreign direct invest-
ments in Norway come from and go to, as well as average tax rates used in
the analysis in this section are to be find in table 22 and 21 in Appendix.
The OLS coefficient for the tax variable is negative and economically signif-
icant indicating that firms that are controlled by the parent companies with
higher tax rates tend to report lower profitability. This is the opposite of
what one would expect according to tax motivated profit shifting hypothe-
ses: higher tax rates in the parent country would imply that more profits
would be shifted out from the parent country and to Norway. The main
weakness of this argument is however that taxes in parent company may
be irrelevant if profits can be shifted to other subsidiaries with lower tax
6The tax rates are collected from the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation
and Ministries in different countries, currently available for this study for years 1996-2006
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Table 19: Introducing taxes in the model.
(1) FMNC (2) FCC-FDI (3) DMNC
(no subsid.) (one subsid.)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
I. Tax rate* –.0395 .0206 –.0291 .0102 –.3040 –.4470
(.026) (.040) (.026) (.040) (.220) (.483)
II. Tax rate higher .0672 .0508 .0682 .0512 –.0450 .0046
than in Norway (.065) (.050) (.064) (.050) (.030) (.042)
Control var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Eff. Yes No Yes No Yes No
Adj. R2 .199 .576 .257 .516 .198 .644
No. of obs. 14 594 14 594 14 223 14 223 1 268 1 268
*Statutory tax rate for the parent country for regressions in columns (1) and (2);
and statutory tax rate in the country of foreign subsidiary - for column (3).
In parentheses: robust SE corrected for clustering within firms.
Industry effects: dummies for NACE 3 digit codes
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
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rates. In the absence of data on other subsidiaries in the corporate group,
one cannot conclude anything more than that. The results reported are
however consistent with the reasoning that there can be higher possibility
that parent companies located in high tax countries are more likely to have
subsidiaries in tax haven countries (or in countries with tax rates lower than
in Norway) to where profits can be shifted from Norway. FE coefficient for
the tax rate in the first panel column (1) is economically significant, posi-
tive and lies at around 2 percentage points, indicating that increase in the
parent country tax rate is associated with increase in the reported profitabil-
ity of its subsidiary located in Norway. The corresponding FE coefficient
is approximately two times lower when the sample is limited to only those
foreign controlled subsidiaries that do not have subsidiaries abroad them-
selves (column (2), panel I in table 19). For these subsidiaries no other
channel than through shifting profits to and from the parent company and
its other affiliates is available. This means that the difference between the
two coefficients implies that shifting to and from the foreign subsidiaries,
that companies in Norway themselves have controlling interest in can also
be an active channel for profit shifting activities. Both of the coefficients are
however not statistically significant. In the last column (3), top panel in ta-
ble 19, the sample consist of the firms that are domestically controlled, but
have one subsidiary abroad. This implies that they only have one channel
to shifting profits, and that the relevant tax rate will be that in the coun-
try of subsidiary7. However representativeness of this sample for the rest
of domestically controlled multinational companies can be questioned. Also
here none of the coefficients are statistically significant. However, both of
them (OLS and FE) are negative and considerable in size, indicating that if
anything, the profits are shifted to the subsidiary facing higher or increasing
tax rates. This contradicts the profit shifting hypothesis, but the number
of observations available for analysis can be too small to make further in-
ferences based on these results. Further research is needed to improve and
extend these regressions.
In the lower panel of the table, instead of using a continuous tax variable
as above a dummy was constructed which is equal to one if the tax rate
in the parent/or foreign subsidiary country was higher than that in Nor-
way. The expectation was that reported profitability for the firms for which
this dummy variable is equal to one, will be higher than for the firms that
7This is under the assumption that we have complete data on the corporate structure
of the multinational group. If corporate group has subsidiaries abroad that it does not
report about to the authorities (for example a subsidiary in a tax haven country), the
argument becomes invalid.
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have parent/foreign subsidiary in a country with lower tax rate than in Nor-
way. The coefficients for the sample of foreign controlled firms (both FMNC
(column (1) and FCC-FDI (column (2))) seem to confirm this expectation,
however, the reported coefficients are not statistically significant at any of
the conventional levels: This is however not surprising since the number of
companies in the sample that have been controlled by parents in the coun-
tries where average tax rates were higher than in Norway turned out to be
just 10. For the domestically controlled firms with one subsidiary abroad,
the higher tax rate in the host country in the subsidiary than in its home
country (in total 94 observations), is shown to be associated with decreased
profitability in Norway. Small and insignificant FE coefficient for the DCC
companies indicate that if the tax in the subsidiary country changes so that
it becomes bigger than tax rate in Norway no systematic differences in prof-
itability of a Norwegian parent occur.
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9 Summary.
The main purpose of this paper was to shed more light on the problem of
negative profitability differential between domestic and multinational firms
in Norway. The contribution of this study is in extending the existing studies
methodologically, as well as with respect to the sample used. The average
profitability of all multinational firms in Norway was compared to the prof-
itability of domestic firms. Since most of the earlier studies only studied
profitability differential between foreign controlled and domestically con-
trolled firms, this means that an important group of domestically controlled
multinational companies was moved out from the control group making it
”cleaner”. The results above indicate that multinational firms are on average
less profitable than domestic firms. The profitability differential reported in
this study is also shown to be both economically and statistically signifi-
cant, lying at around -3.17 percentage points. In comparison to existing
Norwegian studies, it is higher in absolute value, but still comparable to
the differential reported in Langli and Saudagaran (2004), while being of
opposite sign as compared to that reported by Hægeland (2003). None of
the previous studies before this one have used panel data techniques to es-
timate the differential. Both fixed effects (FE), first difference (FD) and
long difference (LD) methods were used for estimations in this study. While
first difference estimations have not given any significant results, long differ-
ence estimates indicated the possibility of measurement errors in the main
explanatory variable. The FE estimates of the differential revealed that
not only multinational firms are on average less profitable than compara-
ble domestic firms, but profitability of the firms that become multinational
reduces with around 1.8 percentage points compared to the domestic firms
that remain domestic. On the outward FDI side, the relative size of the OLS
and FE coefficients have indicated that these are the most productive firms
that extend abroad. The latter is in accordance with predictions from inter-
nationalization theory of the firm. Both the OLS and FE estimates of the
differential for multinational firms were shown to be driven by the foreign
controlled companies (and in particular those that do not have subsidiaries
abroad themselves), even though the profitability is reported to be around
1.3 percentage points lower also for the domestically controlled multinational
companies as compared to pure domestic companies. The negative sign of
the differential estimates is consistent with the fact that if it is caused by
profit-shifting activities, the net stream of shifted profits is out of Norway.
It was further shown from year-by-year regressions that the estimated prof-
itability differential was quite stable and negative through all the 13 years,
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while increasing in absolute value the in last 5 years of the panel. The
differential was also reported to be negative and significant for all the indus-
try groups considered. The only exception has been the retail-industry, for
which the coefficient was neither economically, nor statistically significant.
”Real estate/financial intermediation/business activities” was the industry
group for which the highest difference in average profitability between multi-
national and domestic companies has been reported. Since industries in this
group are generally characterized by intangible nature of their products, the
transfer price for which can more easily be manipulated, this may point in
the direction that the differential found at least partly reflects the profit
shifting activities of the firms. It has also been revealed that FE coeffi-
cients reported for the pooled sample of all industries seem to be mainly
driven by four industry groups, namely ”Wholesale”, ”Hotel/Restaurants”,
”Real estate/Financial intermediation/Business activities” and ”Others”.
The profitability differential has also been estimated for different groups of
companies based on their average sales (divided into quintiles). The dif-
ferential as measured by OLS was shown to be negative and significant for
all the size groups, increasing in absolute value from the fifth to the first
quantile. If the differentials reported can be caused by the profit shifting
activities, this result here may indicate then that smaller companies as well
as the big ones, and possibly even in a bigger degree, may involve in tax
evasion activities. The differential as estimated by FE was however shown
to be negative and significant only for the 3rd, 4th and 5th quantile groups.
This indicates that only companies that have average sales of more than 5
millions NOK and change their status from being domestic to being multi-
national (in particular those that are being taken over by foreigners) report
systematically lower profitability than comparable companies that have not
changed their status.
The profitability differential was also found to be robust negative and sig-
nificant independent of what size controls were included in the regressions.
Neither did choice of profitability measure affect the sign and significance
of the results. However, the percentage of the differential that could be ex-
plained by the different firm characteristics that were controlled for in the
model differed considerably depending on which measure was used. 32% of
the profitability differential as measured by taxable income to sales has been
left unexplained after all the controls were accounted for in the model. The
corresponding figure for the return to capital differential was 66%. Sensi-
tivity of the results has also been tested with respect with different foreign
ownership shares. Minimum of 50% ownership share was used to define for-
eign control throughout most of the study. A 10% threshold has also been
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tested. This adjustment reveals that also companies controlled with foreign
ownership less than 50% report systematically lower profitability than do-
mestic companies, although the difference seems to be much less. The results
for the domestically controlled multinational companies turn insignificant,
both economically and statistically. Furthermore, dummies for the differ-
ent ranges of foreign ownership has been included in the model instead of
a single dummy for foreignness. Independent of ownership share range, all
foreign owned firms were shown to report systematically lower profitability
than domestic firms. Generally, however, the differential estimates declined
in absolute size as ownership share decreased. Transfer of foreign ownership
status into each of this category was associated with decrease in profitability,
with decrease being largest for the fully owned foreign subsidiaries. Firms
that have received foreign direct investments of less than 50% showed no
systematic difference in profitability after the investment has taken place.
This is an important results, which is consistent with the assumption that
profitability differential can be caused by profit-shifting activities. On the
outward FDI side, none of the coefficients for dummies (neither OLS nor
FE) were statistically significant.
In order to test whether multiple changes in foreignness status have affected
FE estimates of the profitability differential, the sample has been ”refined”
to only include companies that changed their ownership status maximum
once. The resulting sample has further been divided into the sample where
firms has changed their status to being multinational, and those who be-
came domestic after being multinational. FE estimate of the differential
revealed that profitability of the firms that changed their foreignness sta-
tus from being domestic to being multinational went down as compared to
the firms that have not experienced a corresponding change. However, no
systematic changes in profitability was found for the firms that became do-
mestic after being multinational. It was also found that the results based
on original sample with multiple status changes were driven by domestic
firms that became multinational. In particular by those that were taken
over by foreigners (FMNC), and to a lesser degree by those domestic firms
that opened foreign subsidiaries abroad (DMNC). In the last part of the
study taxes has been included in the analysis in order to see whether the
differential observed can be shown to be tax-motivated. Even though some
of the coefficients were economically significant and showed signs consistent
with profit shifting hypothesis, none of the two tax rate coefficients were
statistically significant at any conventional significance level.
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10 Conclusions.
The results of this study indicate that multinational firms in Norway on
average report around 30% lower profitability than comparable domestic
firms. Furthermore, it has been shown that profitability of domestic firms
goes down by about 20% when they become multinational. This is after the
account was taken for the most important characteristics and permanent dif-
ferences between these two types of firms. The estimates of the profitability
differential has been shown to be robust to different estimations methods
used, as well as different definitions of multi-nationality and profitability
measure. Even though the evidence provided cannot serve a direct proof
of profit shifting activities by multinational firms in Norway, some of the
findings as described above seem to indicate that they are at least partly
responsible for the relatively low profitability of the multinational firms. In
the absence of better alternatives, this can be enough to increase the aware-
ness of international profit shifting issue that can potentially cost Norwegian
government billions of kroner in foregone tax payments. Further research
is however needed in order to get a better understanding of the problem of
profit-shifting.
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Table 21: Tax rates for the countries of parents companies of foreign owned
companies in Norway.
Country Obs Average tax
(1996-2005)
Denmark 2 567 0.31
Finland 590 0.29
Sweden 5 550 0.28
Belgium 232 0.38
France 301 0.37
Italia 103 0.42
Netherlands 1 338 0.34
Luxembourg 2 0.34
Portugal 14 0.34
Spain 60 0.35
UK 1045 0.31
Russia 30 0.32
Switzerland 581 0.33
Germany 1 046 0.49
Austria 61 0.32
Japan 61 0.43
Costa Rica 28 0.36
USA 985 0.39
Total 14 594 0.35
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Table 22: Tax rates for the countries where Norwegian companies have FDI
(based on sample of companies that have only 1 subsidiary).
Country Obs. Average tax
(1996-2005)
Denmark 166 0.31
Finland 40 0.29
Island 4 0.25
Sweden 534 0.28
Belgium 10 0.38
France 11 0.37
Gibraltar 3 0.35
Irland 7 0.11
Latvia 11 0.22
Netherlands 18 0.34
Luxembourg 9 0.34
Poland 31 0.29
Portugal 19 0.29
Romania 2 0.29
Lithauen 12 0.10
Spain 21 0.35
UK 150 0.31
Russia 13 0.32
Switzeralnd 4 0.33
Turkey 8 0.35
Hungary 9 0.18
Slovakia 3 0.29
Czech Rep. 1 0.30
Egypt 1 0.42
Phillipines 3 0.33
Hong Kong 5 0.17
India 3 0.37
Japan 1 0.43
China 3 0.33
Maldives 7 0.28
Saudi Arabia 2 0.38
Singapore 8 0.24
Bahamas 1 0.00
Bermuda 2 0.00
Costa Rica 19 0.36
Cayman Islands 1 0.00
USA 115 0.39
Brazil 2 0.33
Chile 9 0.16
Total 1 268 0.28
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